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FROM TALLIN TO TASHKENT
Towards uncovering structural preconditions for political 
freedom in  the former Soviet republics 
 
FOREWORD 
The idea for this thesis was as  conceived on a eurasian voyage, aboard a train travelling from 
Alma Aty to Atyrau, passing by the areas around  the Kosmodrom Baykanor.  Baykanor was where 
cosmonaut  Jury Gargarin made it first into space 9 am in the morning the Moscow time, 12th of 
April year 1961. At that time the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USSR was a wast empire 
extending from the Pacific and China to the Atlantic and Europe, and to many then even seemed 
ahead of USA on the space and technology race.  Some 40 years after Gagarins launch  that 
empire had crumbled, and as I travelled trough the remains of it, the post-soviet space, now 
constituted by  15 independent states, all of them have chosen very different political paths, with 
enormous differences in political freedom as result. This region is a unique laboratory to 
understand precondition for democracy, as their variation is so huge today, but their starting 
point was so similar in 1991. Examining the causes of variation might lead us to the precondition 
required for liberalization. In this thesis I wish to test  structural theories about liberalization, 
elite and democracy  tho see if they can aid uncovering domestic precondition, features of the 
states, that would explain the level of political freedom in the former soviet republics. By 
uncovering such precondition I hope to  better understand the political development of the  
former Soviet Union and the foundations of liberalisation and  democracy. From Tallin to Tblisi, 
Minsk to Moscow, Vilnius to Yerevan. 
God lesing!  	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 Welcome, Dear Reader! 
	
 	

	
 	
 	
 Oslo, April 2006 
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1 .  INTRODUCTION
Political freedom in the Post-soviet space
A remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of  democracy as a system of government has 
emerged throughout the world, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, 
and most recently communism.  Democracy may constitute (...) the “final form of human 
government,” and the “end of history.” 
Francis Fukuyama, 1992
	

When asked by a foreign journalist what he thought about democracy in post-soviet 
independent Turkmenistan, the Turkmen President-for-life Saparmura Niyazov replied        
  “-Democracy ,  - that is me”. Niyazov was head of the SSR Communist party already in 
1985, and when his country became independent by the collapse of USSR ,  he installed 
himself as president and no one has ever run against his chair in a presidential poll since.  
Opposition parties have been banned. Subscribing foreign newspapers is restricted and 
neighbourhood committees surveil political dissidents. (Freedom House, 
2005:Turkmenistan) Another former SSR is Lithuania, which today is a consolidated de-
mocracy, where governments have changed several times, peacefully and through free 
and fair elections. In 2004 Lithuania was accepted as a member of the EU, meaning that 
its constitution not only guarantees recruiting governments by elections, but also has a  
built-in judicial  protection of minority rights, freedom of speech and press. Both Turk-
menist and Lithuania had a politicaly uniform past in the USSR,  but after independence 
they took very different future paths.  They are indicative of the variety of political free-
dom visible in the region today. The 15 post-soviet succesor states differ enormously, de-
spite  70 years of a common single system  of Leninism (50 yeas for Moldova & the Baltic 
SSRs). The Post-soviet space spans from democratic Baltic states to sultanistic Central-
Asian states, and from authoritarian Belarus with unlimited presidential powers  to semi-
democratic, pluralistic Ukraine, with a recently installed and functioning parliamentary 
system.  Ukraine and Georgia have been experiencing so-called “colour revolutions” 
while  Russia and Armenia seems to be in a “autoritarian backlash”.  Belarus started on a 
democratic path 1991-93, but soon sidetracked in 1994. While Uzbekistan violently 
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cracked down anti-regime demonstrations in 2005, demonstrations in Kyrgyz elections 
led to the president ﬂeeing to Russia, and leading the opposition leader into power.  
What determined their different path, if they all departed in 1991  from the same politi-
cal unit? Because democratisation came instantly and simultaneously to all of the 15 for-
mer Soviet republics, the former soviet union republics (from now on called FSU) repre-
sent one  is one of the worlds most unique and largest labs to compare the political de-
velopment of new-born democracies, and analyze the process of liberalization.  By this 
study I hope to shed light on precondition for political  liberalization in the former So-
viet Union, with general  implications also for other regions in transit to liberal democ-
racy. The quest is interesting for scholars trying to understand what creates and what de-
teriorates democracies and political freedom, but also interesting for all foreign  policy 
makers and non-governmental groups inside or outside the FSU whose aim to spread a 
liberal democracy. If there are precondition for liberalization, the question for policy 
makers is  to review is how those precondition be influenced in order to promote liber-
alization. I am therefore looking for structural precondition that can be influenced by 
policy, short-term or long-term. 
1.2. Structures decide     The quest for preconditions is based on a belief that structures 
determinates the development.  My approach can there best be labeled as a structural 
approach. I have chosen three structuralist theories, each from development theory, 
democracy theory and elite theory that suggest measures of  internal (domestic)  
structural preconditions that will determine and explain  liberalisation. I will test  the 
ability of these theories  to explain the present level of political freedom in the 
post-soviet space. I focus as mentioned only on theories which base on preconditions 
that are domestic(internal)  and whom on a long-term base can  be inﬂuenced by 
domestic (internal) or foreign states policy (external).  This means I exclude for instance 
unchangeable  preconditions for liberalisation  like “length of authoritarian regime”, 
“previous history as independent state”, “outcome of ﬁrst election” or “main religion” 
(religions I exclude also for other reasons).  
 The three theories chosen are 1) the distribution of economical and intelectual power 
resources in a society, 2) the modernisation theory of socioeconomic development and 3)  
the theory of fragmentation of elites. From here on i will call them IPR-theory, the HDI 
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theory and fragmented elite-theory, and they will be better presented in the theory 
chapter. My two research questions are: 
	
 Can the IPR, socioeconomic development and #agmentation of  elites be preconditions  explain 	

	
 the variation of political #eedom  in the post-soviet space? 
	
 If yes, how can the IPR, socioeconomic development and #agmentation of  elites be 	
 	

	
 preconditions  explain the variation of political #eedom  in the post-soviet space? 
1.3 Political freedom I deﬁne as existence of political features that make #ee and fair elections 
possible, that makes turnover of governmental power with democratic means possible, that secures 
#eedom of information and limits the fu$ authority of the state.  The most important features 
of political freedom is  judicial independence from the executive power, a functional rule 
of law,  a  democratic oversight of military and security  services, multiple party system, 
freedom to form and join organisations, free press, respect for minorities and 
constitutional protection of human rights. Political freedom is not a synonym to democ-
racy, but an aspect of democracy. All cases (states) in my sample meet a minimalist 
deﬁnition of democracy. However they diﬀer on degrees of democracy; one could say 
they are diﬀerent kinds of democracies (from liberal or consolidated democracies to 
pseudo-democracies, ethnocracies, facade democracies and other labels have been 
suggested). I argue that  degree of any democracy deﬁnition is probably best measured 
by the degree of their political freedom.  Studying political freedom wil therefor also tell 
us something about the development of democracy (the democratic consolidation, the 
development after transition to democracy) in the post-soviet space.  The development 
of political freedom is according to O´Donnel and Schmitter a  process of liberalisation 
(diﬀerent from  democratisation) (Karvonen, 1997: 76).   The operationalisation of 
political freedom will be the Freedom Scale, produced by Freedom House, and this choice 
is argued and discussed  in the chapter on data.   The units are the  15 states that came 
out of the USSR, the post-soviet succesor states. They will be referred to as FSU. The 
FSU are chosen as a lab to test for structural precondition for the process of liberaliza-
tion, because they all were soviet states when they democratized in 1991, and 15 years 
later they have a large variety of political freedom. Which precondition determined this 
development? The three theories suggest three different explanations and I will test 
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them as independent variables explaining the dependent variable political freedom. I will 
test them one by one, and later see if they can combined in a two-factor or three factor-
model. 
V A R I A B E L O P E R A T I O N A L I S A T I O N
(Independent A)  Power resource distribution IPR - Index of Power Resources (Vanhanen)
(Independent B) Socioeconomic development level HDI - Human Development Report 
(Independent C) Elite fragmentation Nr. of eﬀective president candidates previous. election
(Dependent C)Variation of political freedom in FSU Freedom Scale  7 - 1 
1. 4 Independent variables. Preconditions for  freedom.   The theory of inde-
pendent variable A assumes that higher  distribution of economical and intellectual re-
sources, like income, property and education in society will influence the strength of a 
political freedom:  the less concentrated economic  and intellectual  resources are on few 
hands, the more freedom persists.  The precondition for freedom according to IPR the-
ory is  the distribution of economical and intellectual resources, which is operationalised 
as the Index of Power Resources, invented by Tatu Vanhanen.  
Independent variable B is a theory of socioeconomic development. The basic assump-
tion of the theory is that the more well-to-do (educated, healthy and wealthy) a popula-
tion is, the more political freedom. Socioeconomic development is based on classical 
modernist theoretical foundation of amongst other Lipset and Diamond,  and is opera-
tionalised here as the  Human Development Index, invented by UNDP. 
 Independent variable C is  the theory of  fragmented elites. The basic assumption of 
this theory is that a when political power is distributed, when there is real competition 
for governmental power, - a fragmented elite, -  prospects improve for the existence for 
the civil and political rights. When a country is ruled by elections with universal frag-
mentation, high elite fragmentation increases the value of political freedom. This inde-
pendent variabel is based on Mosca and Easter, and  operationalised by the effective 
number of candidates in the most recent presidential election.   
I have designed a model to suggest how the theories interact. I will operationalise the 
theories and then test the their hypothesis by  linear regression (and cross reference with 
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cross tabulation) one by one. For the model  I will use observation of the units in a table  
and  causal analysis to check the  interaction between significant theories. 
Data on political freedom are provided by  Freedom House. IPR values are provided by 
Vanhanen in his book. HDI is published yearly in Human Development Report. Elec-
tion results are provided Central Election Committees in the FSU, and published in  
Electionworld.org. Datas reliability and the validity of the analysis. will be discussed after 
the presentation of them and after the analysis. Qualitative data on political freedom in 
the FSU states will be included as  background information,  but will not be counted as 
data in the analysis. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis   The order of appearances is as follows: Chapter 2 -  Theo-
retical framework for the theories and  the model: arguing the choice of structural theo-
ries. Chapter 3 - Introduction to the concept of political freedom. Chapter 4 - introduc-
tion to the theories.  Chapter 5 -  The operationalisation of the variables. Chapter 6 
Presentation of empirical data and the units and country background.  Chapter 7 de-
scribes the methodology. Chapter 8 is the analysis on each theories explanatory power on 
political freedom, and on a model,  followed by a discussion on validity and reliability. 
Chapter 9 is a final discussion of the finding and the discussions of the analysis. In the 
final discussion I will include points from other theoretical explanations, like external 
geopolitical environment.   All what has been done and found and concluded will be 
summed up in the Conclusion. I underline that each theory for explaining political free-
dom will be analyzed individually, and then a possible joint model will be analyzed  In the 
end follows the conclusion.  
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2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Structure of theory chapter
To explain the variation of political freedom  in the former Soviet Union I have chosen 
three theories on domestic precondition  that might inﬂuence  the level of political 
freedom in FSU. All three  theories come from  structural, modernisational and 
universalist tradition, not actor-oriented, procedural and generic.  I will argue why I 
choose structural approaches over actor-oriented and why I choose universalist theories 
to study democracy and the former soviet union, rather than generic theories. 
2. 1 Selection of theories
Geofrey Pridham suggests that a overall-model to explain political freedom in post-
communist spaces should include:  “historical determinants, (cultural background, authoritarian leg-
acy ), authoritarian collapse (type of revolution and transition to democracy and the following conse-
quences for regime type) , institutional design, the political dimension (actors and elite reactions), eco-
nomic transformation (interaction new economy and new policy (...)  type of growth, distribution of 
growth), civil society and elite choices (effects from top to bottom, or bottom to top), the international 
environment (external influences) and stateness and national identity.  (Pridham, 2000: 26-27).  Illustra-
tion 1  includes these elements and several other suggested theories.  Merkcell adds to 
this the role of the first elections and  the institutional design of the first constitution 
(Merkel, 2002:111-113)  As illustration show, such a model is to huge to be run comparative 
tests on, and it includes not only factors that can be inﬂuenced, but all other structural 
factors, historical, economical and on also non-structural, like actors choice and type of 
leaders. I have had  to limit my study to the three most important structural  measures I 
believe are precondition for liberalisation.  Pridhams model is so  large model is best 
tested on cases, and then it can only explain the countries development case by case. It  
can not help us ﬁnd common precondition that might determine liberalisation in all 
countries or any country, and that is what  my research question has compelled  me to 
uncover. 
Testing  Pridham´s model of  precondition would be extremely complicated. The model 
has so many variables anyway, anything could be explained if you tried to combine them. 
I have preferred to chose three dimensions that I believe can uncover preconditions for 
political freedom in the FSY and that can be inﬂuenced by policy. These three 
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dimensions are the distribution of economic and intelectual power and the 
fragmentation of the elites and socio-economic theory. I will now argue why I left other 
explanations out and why I choose the three I have. 
I$ustration 1. Overview of structural theories that have been su&ested to explain political #eedom 
and liberalisation in the former Soviet republics. 
2.2. Post-soviet  theories
Pridham´s model is a  general model  for post-communist countries. Several theories that 
could have been used to explain precondition for a larger group of post-communist are 
not equally relevant to compare the  post-soviet countries. I will elaborate on the 
diﬀerence of post-soviet and post-communis heritage later. But one important point is 
the degree of existing social capital (apart from the Baltic states, where it plays a role), 
that suggest the the strength of political freedom is determined by the strength of the 
civil society, in terms of existing non-governmental organisations and other non-
governmental parts of civil society.  I do not disregard this theory, but I select the social 
capital theory out  because   non-governmental life has been at a relatively equal level in 
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all Soviet republics during the Soviet period and remains insigniﬁcaly correlated to 
democratisation  (Dowley, 2003:99) NGOs were mostly banned  in Soviet times, and even 
labour unions functioned as part of state and the employing unit (Arkady Moshes, 2004).  
With social capital being relatively uniform throughout the FSU, social capital can not be  
decisively in explaining in for the enormous diﬀerent level of political freedom 15 years 
later (apart from maybe the Baltics, where social capital was noticeable diﬀerent from the 
rest of USSR).  As for type of authoritarian collapse was equal for all states: transition to 
democracy through the collapse of the USSR (again with a partial exception for the 
Baltic, whom received partial democracy under autonomy one year earlier). 
Theories of stateness in explaining FSU transition  claims that political freedom is linked 
with previous experiences of having a state, prior to being a SSR.  I leave the theory of 
stateness out for two reasons: 1) empirical - both political measured free Baltics and 
politically measured unfree Russia has long history of stateness, as is the same for semi-
authoritarian Armenia as for semi-democracy Georgia.   2) Historical stateness can not be 
inﬂuenced by policy. 
Unchangeable. Because I  am looking for precondition that can be inﬂuenced by 
policy, I  exclude several historical explanations like length of communism and feudal 
tradition and geographical ones, like location.  
Actors. Actors choice theories are left out because they don´t uncover the long-term 
precondition.  Most theories on external environment are also left out for the same 
reason, I wish to study the domestic precondition  for what happened, not just the cause 
of what happened, and the structural precondition for it to happen  regardless of the 
choice of actors and the impact of external forces. However, the geopolitical impact is 
regarded to be som important in many cases, and  it will be brought into discussion. 
Cultural. I have also left out  comparative cultural explanation concerning religions and 
religious areas (a Muslim belt, a Catholic belt, etc), the most famous being Huntington’s 
“clash of civilisations”.  Empirical evidence counters  the theory that democracy only de-
velops in certain religions and cultural settings.   There are states with  political freedom 
in all civilisation-areas/religions: India, Japan, Mongolia, Turkey, to mention some exam-
ples. Also, I leave cultural explanations out because they are self-explanatory. Before 
there was democracy in the Protestant area, there was non-democracy. If democracy can 
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not evolve in the “non-democratic environment”, then how did it develop in the first 
place?  the “supposed correct environment” or as Gel´man states: “ while Post-soviet countries 
cannot achieve democracy because of their “wrong” culture, the “right” culture have a few chances to emerge here 
because of absence of democracy” (Gel’man, 2004)
2.3 Arguing the paradigm of structuralism
My theoretical framework is  materialist, structuralist and a development-theoretical, 
meaning I emphasize the economical base of society, and structures more than political 
explanations and more than actors choice.  In political science this tradition is often la-
beled materialist, realist or marxist approach, as opposed to liberalist and idealist, actor-
oriented  which are typically more oriented on choices, on leaders, on elites and ideas.  
(Østerud, 2005:51)
As Merkel describes it structuralists trying to explain transition emphasize die “sozio-
und machstrukturelle Zwänge”  that force transformation. (Merkell, 2002:45) Transfor-
mation is a keyword: the basic paradigm of the development-theoretical framework is 
that development is linear. Structural theories base on development-theoretical perspec-
tives on  political regime change (Østerud, 2005:49): the belief in development as a cer-
tain type of stepwise  development that can be described.  I measure units by their level 
of political freedom. I believe that units through liberalisation can move up the scale, e.g. 
 from dictatorship to democracies,  or, in case of backlashes,  from democracies to 
authoritarian regimes.  
The paradigm of marxism that the   base of society (economical structure)  decides its 
“roof” (political structure).  So-called “new modernists” (1970s and onwards) opposed the 
idea that modernization was one scale to develop along, and believed modernization 
could come in many forms. New modernization theory also focused more based of soci-
ety then the pure economical.  I think my study could be labeled new-modernistic, mate-
rialistic and regional, with universal ambitions, or a structural approach is that combine  
new-modernization (development-theoretical)  and class theory (marxist). Key variables 
explaining a degree of  liberalisation is  often levels of development and class structure, 
and so will I use. 
Too early to say.  An important critique against searching for “objective” precondition, 
is that they have not only a long-term pre-history, but also a long-term impact that could 
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be negligible in short-term perspective.  I argue against this that 15 years is sufficient 
time to draw conclusions. 
2.4 Arguing universalist approach
The development perspective has been criticized for being too  universal, and not to 
adapt to local particularities, as it believes to create models that will  apply to most mod-
ern states. Development theory is divided in a rival school of classic  modernization the-
ory (internal factors specialization of labour  leads to growth, and growth will produce 
democracy) /new-modernization and dependency theory (external factors unfair precondi-
tion for international trade leads to growth only in rich countries, development is deter-
mined by a units placement in systems)/new dependency school, but they share the view 
of a line of development, possible to measure and scale, and that political development 
can be described with types/trajectories and faces/periods, and that certain explanation 
can be given, certain preconditions determine the outcome (modernisationist emphasize 
internal/domestic ones, dependency theorists external/systemic ones). The major scholar 
counter-argument  to such universalist approach stems from the   “procedural”/ “case 
based” /“generic”  approach. The procedural approach claims no  precondition for any 
given development  exists: everything is decided in the process (Gel´man, 2004:13)  The 
procedural approach is therefore rather to study what did happen, then creating theories 
on what determined the  outcome.  I argue that too generic approach is unfit for uncov-
ering domestic precondition for liberalisation  that can be influenced by policy. A proce-
dural approach will only tell us what happened in each and different, not the underlying 
causes for how what made it happen this way, and that is common for all cases. 
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While the theory of power resources and of socioeconomic development is a theory of 
modernization, emphasizes the internal structural and dynamical  disposition for political free-
dom  in every FSU , the theory of elite fragmentation is a theory of elite. 
2.5 Elite theory: Class and elite 
Elite theory  has not been connected with transitions in the same way as development 
theory. The main theoretical tradition that that oppose eachother inside what is generally 
called elite theory is “class theory” and “elite theory”. (Hallevy, 1997:14)  Class theory de-
rives from a marxist perspective and elite theory from liberal perspective. Class theory is 
commonly divided into a marxist tradition and takes a more economical perspective, and 
a  Weberian tradition, where its not only means of production who defines class, but also 
other factors: property, lifestyle, cultural consumption and status. Lockwood, Lenski and 
Mills are classical Weberians in this aspect (Hallevy, 1997: 17) Elite theory, focuses not on 
economy like class theory, but on political power. The basic assumption is that society is 
divided into elites where power is concentrated, and they will always be a minority com-
pared to the mass. Classical theorists are Mosca and Pareto (Hallevy, 1997: 21) Mills for-
mulated the famous concept of “power elites”, which he meant ruled the USA in the 
1950s, to such a degree it interfered with the political freedom of the USA. Elite theorists 
mostly agree on that elites create policy and “rule the ruled”, but they have discourse 
over the effect of the structure of the elite. Moscas main idea is that the character and 
structure of the ruling class is forming of the political structure (Hallevy, 1997:59). He ar-
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guments historically : feudal society had unfragmented elites  - the same elite has military, 
economical and political powers. The bureaucratic state had a more fragmented elite: dif-
ferentiation in duties - a economical elite different from the political one. The democratic 
state divides the political power into those who are appointed (bureaucrats) and popular 
suffrage. This latter differentiation creates a system where one elite group exercises re-
ciprocal control on the other- and this, according to Mosca, creates more liberty (democ-
racy) for the ruled.  Schumpeter extends this idea, also to include other elites than the 
state/governmental elites: it is the compromise between elites that defines the level of 
political freedom. Raymond Aron suggests five typical elites in a modern society: political 
elite, bureaucrat elite, economical elite, labour elites and military elites. His main point is 
that if they are unified, the less freedom. In Communist states all the five elites, belong 
to the same elite. In the liberal state, they belong to rivaling elites. This difference is what 
Aron calls monopolistic vs pluralistic elite structure. (Østerud, 2005:151) The more frag-
mented elite, the less state. According to Aron a balanced elite fragmentation (among the 
ruled) is therefor the best elite factor in explaining “freedom for the ruled”. (Hallesvy, 
1997: 61) Democratic elite theory is a “mixture school” emphasizes political freedom, 
while structuralist  perspectives more economical equality.  
In studying the post-soviet union the elite aspect is extremely interesting aspect. The 
reason is because the USSR had no power sharing divisions in its institutions, or as Aron 
called it: a monopolistic elite. Thus the elites were unified and often allied across Aron´s 
five borders- the nomenclature was en elite of both labour, economy, military, political 
and bureaucracy, because the state was centralized. However, other cleavages did appears, 
such as ethnical cleavages and economical, where division of labour created a more diver-
sified economy. These cleavages came more apparent when they re-emerged on a national 
level  and elites could compete for governmental power through elections and when the 
Union level of elite  was removed from the national level. Ukraine is an example of a state 
where elite fragmentation is seen as high based on Ukrainian-Orthodox vs Russian-
Orthodox Church, Ukrainian and Russian language, the Western heritage of 
Austrian.-Hungarian empire vs the Eastern heritage of the Russian empire, agricultural 
and agribusiness vs mining and energy production or privatisated vs state owned enter-
prises. (Arkady Moshes, 2004). My general assumption in independent variabel C is that 
the existence of such pluralistic elite is a preconditionfor explaingin the variation of po-
litical freedom in the FSU. 
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2.7  The Region: Sovietology 
  I have chosen the FSU region because it  is a  unique political science lab for comparing 
political freedom in 15 “similar cases” Before the fall of the USSR, the scholar tradition 
which studied liberalization used to be concentrated in completely other geographical 
regions than Eastern Europe (esp. Southern Europe and Latin America), as there was no 
democracy  to study in Eastern Europe (Parrot/Dawisha, 1997: 2).  Before the collapse of 
the USSR, the main scholar tradition to study political freedom in the FSU  was “Sovie-
tology”.  Sovietologists were divided in supporters of the  “the totalitarian model” and 
“the revisionist approach”.  “Totalitarians” argued that the “natural progression” of 
Soviet/Russian society toward modernity and liberalisation  had been artificially diverted 
by the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. “Revisionists, argued that the political dynamics in an 
industrialized, urbanized, and educated Soviet society were becoming increasingly similar 
to those of other modern regimes. (Hanson, 2004) None of the Sovietoligsts predicted 
the downfall of Communism, and so Sovietology was soon replaced by “transitology” af-
ter USSR collapse.  In the “transitology period”,   the early 1990s,  most scholars assumed 
that the lessons of transition in Latin America in 70s and 80s would be applicable to 
Central Eastern Europe and FSU  in the 1990s. Instead of being “the other” for Western 
scholars, the Soviet area was now “like us”, and became  studied by social science, using 
methods and concepts that had already functioned to explain transitions in Latin Europe 
and Latin America. (Rutland, 2003) The first transitologists however soon discovered that 
lessons learnt from other non-communist transitions were not always applicable in post-
communist countries (Parrot/Dawisha, 1997). 
Post-authoritarian, Post-Communism  or Post-sovietism. The “differentness” of 
Post-communism from other post-authoritarian transitions soon dawned upon social sci-
entists: a sudden collapse of high-developed welfare system, the sudden privatization  
combined with the democratization, rise of oligarchs, the shift from organized surveil-
lance and intelligence to organized crime,   the lack of tax collection systems and the fact 
that so many ex-authoritarian states democratized at the same time, not “one by one” to 
be absorbed into the “democratic fold”.  As the post-communist-era developed, it became 
obvious “post-communism” was not one united phenomena, as it featured such wide vari-
ety of  cases from Slovenia to Turkmenistan. Vladimir Gel’man is among those who  criti-
cizes post-communist and universalist transotologists for failing to grasp the essence of 
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Russianness and Central Asianess. Both Transitology and Sovietology were based on 
modernization theories expectation that  industrialization, urbanization, and education 
would inevitably transform “traditional” agrarian societies and cultures to produce “mod-
ern” societies built on individualism.  During the 1990s these modernisationists were 
confronted with what in a Western context seemed as irrational choices in FSU; 
While committed to democratic values in the abstract, Russians did not think very highly of the factual democracy.  
Russian values  were worry of rise of crime and corruption. They were assertive of their own rights but not very 
tolerant of opposing views.  (... ) “Their desire for a strong leader was balanced by a corrosive suspicion of the state 
and skepticism about the law.  (...) There were few  signs of an emergent civil society. These ﬁndings underlined the fact 
that the break-up of the Soviet Union and the transition to market democracy had been an elite-led, top-down aﬀair in 
Russia” (Rutland, 2003).
This Russian “mindset”  along other features like clan structures in Central Asia, 
century-old conﬂicts in Caucasus, the aftermath of Stalins mass exoduses of certain 
ethnical minorities, the existence of a  Russian diaspora and  states with no past record of 
nationhood before 1991 soon  “kicked in” on Post-communism to prove that  “Post-
sovietism” was diﬀerent from post-communism in Central Eastern Europe and other 
places.  In mid-1990s the problem of coexistence of “universalism” that taken roots in the 
comparative politics, and “particularism” that reﬂected speciﬁc post-Communist realities, 
became a core of polemic among scholars.  
But all forms of particularism, the occupation-nature  of Baltic soviet membership,  the  
“differentness” of Russia for being an empire and geographically stretched, Central-Asia 
for its nomadic and borderless history,  Caspian region with its heavy interest sin oil and 
other particular groupings would make it impossible  to compare anything, e. g a “Russian 
Russia” and a “Central Asian Kyrgyzstan”.  A case could for instance be made against  in-
cluding the three Baltic countries on this scale , as they have less Soviet features than the 
other 15 (and primarily parliamentary systems) and  stayed shorter as SSRs and have de-
veloped politicaly under EU protection and sponsorship. However, they were all one uni-
fied system from 1945 to 1991 and by comparing all 15 I hope to uncover measurable 
structural precondition. 
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 3.  DEPENDENT VARIABEL
WHAT IS POLITICAL FREEDOM? 
3.1 Defining political freedom  
The dependent variabel of my study  is : political freedom in the former Soviet Union (FSU).  
I deﬁne political freedom as existence of political features that make #ee and fair elections 
possible, and turn-over of governmental power with democratic means likely, that secures #eedom of 
information and limits the authority of the state.  The most important features of political 
freedom are, as I mentioned in the introduction: 
judicial independence from the executive power, a rule of law,  a  democratic oversight of 
military and security  services, multiple partysystem, freedom to form and join 
organisations, free press, and constitutional protection of minorities and human rights. 
Democracy, for reference, I have deﬁned as   “political system based on a constitutional 
guarantee for the  executive power to be periodica$y elected in  elections with  universal su,age”.  
This is not the liberal deﬁnition of democracy, but a minimal (Østerud, 2005:107) All 
cases in my meet the minimal deﬁnition of democracy. However they diﬀer on degrees of 
democracy, which I believe the degree of their political freedom will measure. The 
distinction is important: I measure political freedom, but I believe I can generalize from 
this to democracy.  Political freedom is not a synonym democracy, but an aspect of 
democracy, especially of the  liberal democracy.   The liberal definition of democracy  
derives  from liberal thinkers like John Lock, David Hume and Montesqu. The basic 
principles of their democracy idea  is that democracy is not just rule of the majority, or 
governmental recruitment by elections, but a regime where executive power is limited by 
certain  individual (liberal) rights and liberties. (Halevy, 1993:53) Like Lijphart said “ (..) 
Democracy should “not be measured by it´s ability to give rule to the majority, but on its 
ability to protect the minority”. Therefore by uncovering  precondition for political 
freedom, I study the development of liberalisation, not democratisation/democratic 
consolidation, after a transit to a (minimalist) democracy is made. 
In a liberal democracy government bodies are separated in a legislative, executive and 
judicial body who share power and check and balance each-other.  Schumpeter and 
Robert Dahl are typical exponents for this type of democracy deﬁnitions.    Our 
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deﬁnition of political freedom can distinguish the degree democracy is, by measuring the 
level of political freedom inside the FSUs formally  democratic system.  To conclude: our 
deﬁnition of political freedom is not democracy, but democratic civil and political rights, 
and my deﬁnition makes political freedom a a indicator of the degree of democracy
 3.2 Arguing liberalisation.  My definition of political freedom  can be criticized for 
being too focused on its relation to democracy, but I argue that all FSUs have a formal 
democratic system including periodical elections for president and/or parliament, and 
thus political freedom is best measured as the ability to realize this democratic regime.  I 
also argue that is is more precise in the case of FSU to study liberalisation than democratic 
consolidation in the FSU region, because the diﬀerence in political development is more 
clearly visible in terms of freedom than in terms of democracy, which every FSU tries to 
keep up appearances as. Post-communist democracies , especially post-totalitarian ones 
like the USSR successor states, are often 
 for being covers for undemocratic regimes: Diamond talks of “pseudo” democracies, O
´Donnels  of “delegative” democracies and Zakarias of  “il” democracies (Herron, 
2001). Even a  “beacons of democracy” like Estonia has such a pitfall: When analyzing 
Baltic democracy in 2002, Gill  labeled Estonia  a ethnic democracy and a subdivision 
facade democracies like the Central Asian FSU (Gill, 2002:111)   The underlying premise 
of  all these regimes are  that the existence of free and fair elections alone is not adequate 
for a state to qualify as a democracy.     Gel´man claims touches the same point:  “simple 
test of free and fair elections could be irrelevant at the time of machine politics and 
parties of power (...)  where even competitive  election (even competitive one) to a 
certain degree upon opportunities of ruling groups for administrative mobilization of 
masses as well as electoral fraud, not to mention systematically unequal assess of 
candidates to campaign” (Gel`man, 2004:6)  Herron ﬁnds that  assumption that “free 
elections equals democracy” has been challenged particularly in post-communist states, 
and that elections alone are not suﬃcient for democracy to emerge. By choosing to study 
liberalisation (political freedom) rather than democratic consolidation  ( after transition 
to a democracy)  I am more able to avoid the pitfall of pseudo democracies and variables 
and pinpoint better  the diﬀerence in political  development between the FSU. 
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4.  INDEPENDENT VARIABELS
THE THEORIE S 
V A R I A B E L H Y P O T H E S I S O P E R A T I O N
A L I S A T I O N
T H E O R Y 
O R I G I N
A. The power resource 
distribution
High distribution of power resources 
create high political freedom
IPR - Index of Power 
Resources  
Tatu Vanhanen, Lipset.
B. Fragmentation of 
elites 
Highly fragmented elite creates 
political freedom 
Nr. of eﬀective president 
candidates most recent  
election
Gerald M. Easter, Mosca, 
Aron, Schumpeter 
C. Socioeconomic 
Development 
The more well-to-do a country, the 
more political freedom
Human Development 
Index 
Lipset, Diamond
.(Dependent)Variation 
of political freedom 
(PF) in FSU
Freedom House 
Democracy scale 1- 7 
Liberal democracy, Locke, 
Hume, Freedom House
4. 1  Hypothesizes suggested by theories. 
1) Countries with a high distribution of economic and non-economic power resources 
(IPR) will have a high political freedom.  
2) Countries with a politicaly fragmented elite will have have a high political freedom
3) Countries with a high socioeconomic development will have a high political freedom
 The theories are expected to have a single causal effects each on politcal freedom in the 
FSU, illusterated in this model. This model does not show correlations or interaction be-
tween the independent variables. 
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illustration 2. The direct effect of the independent variables
4.2  Theory A. Vanhanens power resource distribution
 Power distribution determines  the evolution of democracy. 
Tatu Vanhanen claims democracy arrives on the scene of history  as a result of a political 
evolution. (Vanhanen, 2003:26 ) When a group in power no longer is able to uphold 
power over other groups without using too much of the scarce resources available, 
democracy evolves, as “the fittest” system. The advantage for a former elite in  sharing 
power is no costs in oppression resources or civil wars. According to Vanhanen, the 
process of democratisation depends on the distribution of relevant economical and 
intellectual power resources (PR). This is a primarily materialist view: the economic 
shape of society will form it politicaly.  Political democratisation, Vanhanen argues,  takes 
place under precondition in which PR have become so widely distributed that no group 
in society any longer is able to maintain hegemony over other groups. (Vanhanen, 
2003:29) Vanhanen has produced a index to measure the PR.  According to Vanhanen this 
index ( IPR) is able to predict when a non-democracy reaches democratisation.  He 
tested it on 172 countries 1850 - 1979, and what able to predict the ID in ca. 70% of the 
cases.  However, Vanhanen did not predict democratisation in 1991 for USSR.  I will 
claimed  democratisation came “imposed” on USSR in 1991 and that Vanhanens ID is not 
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enough to describe the effect of the IPR in the FSU . I expect the IPR value to not just 
to predict democratisation, but explain the level of political freedom.  Vanhanen has also 
suggested this possibility. Parrot has given this perspective especial validity in  FSU by 
claiming the authoritarian Soviet system dug its own grave - created democratisation -  by 
producing a lot of students in  higher education over the decades: “their drive to raise 
educational levels gradually expanded the social group whose members found those (the 
Communist) ideological claims implausible or absurd” (Parrot, 1997:13) The IPR is able to 
amongst other measure this process, in combination with the division of labour. 
The relationship IPR and ID remained relatively strong throughout the period 
Vanhanen tested for  (Vanhanen, 2003 :31). Vanhanen also predicted in  1984 that Poland 
and Yugoslavia  where theoretically “ripe” for democratisation or should already have 
become democracies.  Vanhanen resorted to external factors and dependency theory to 
explain why they had not: the external role of a Great Power - the USSR. Communist 
countries  he argued later,  would increase their IPR  greatly if it wasn’t for the fact that 
all assets where formally on the hands of the government, and that “real” distribution of 
property was difficult to measure during the cold war and formally marxist system.  
Vanhanen claimed pressure for democracy would probably be enchanted, and the 
“consequences of this pressure are incalculable” at the same time as most Sovietologists 
were incapable of predicting the fall of the Berlin wall, or the collapse of the USSR.  In 
Vanhanens 1984-study of the states of the world IPR explained 64% of the variation. In 
1990 IPR explained 70%. In 1990 however, suddenly more Eastern European countries 
where democracies than the IPR suggested, - which I take as a sign that democratisation 
was partially imposed externally  on several FSU states, and did not develop internally. 
Vanhanens view is materialist and structural:   political power resources are determined by  
the structure of economic and intelectual  power resources (IPR).   
4. 3 Fragmentation of post-soviet elite 
        “Having changed their titles from the ﬁrst secretary of the Communist Party to prime minister/president 
was largely the extent of democracy in these states”
Yevgeny Bendersky, 2005 
“The more fragmented the ruling elites are, the more political freedom for the ruled ”. 
This is the basic elite theory  I will test.  This theory is constructed from the two basic 
elements: Moscas theory of elite structure and Easters categorization of the  post-soviet 
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elites. Moscas elite theory claims the structure of elites will define the structure of 
regime: different, independent elites who keep eachother controlled provides liberal 
democracy, while unified, consolidated elites created authoritanism.  (Hallesvy, 1993) 
Gerald M. Easter categorized such structures in the post-soviet, into three basic types of 
post-soviet state elites:  consolidated, dispersed and reformed. (Easter, 1997) Elite theory 
is especially  valid for the post-soviet space, of which most historically have been ruled 
top - down, by elite. (Waage, 1991)
The deﬁnitions given by Easter of “consolidated nomenclature“ is  nomenclature which  
suﬀered little fragmentation and maintained its dominance. The nomenclature is the 
elite which ruled labour, economy and state in the Soviet times.  “Dispersed 
nomenclatures”  are deﬁned by Easters as nomenclature whose power crumbled 
completely, and has to compete for political power on equal footing with other political 
actors.  “Reformed nomenclature”  is a post-independence elite which is split and part of 
it was able to maintain a share  of power by reforming itself. As we can see from this table 
he also believed that the elites position in the “founding years” of post-soviet states 
would deﬁne the institutional design of the constitutions. 
Table 4.3 1 EASTERS ELITE . Elite shift in the FSU as  defined by Gerald M Easter mid-90s. 
E L I T E D E F . F S U S Y S T E M
“Reformed old elite” The old nomenclature split and part of it was 
able to maintain a share  of power by reforming 
itself.  
Armenia, Moldova, 
Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, 
Belarus
presidential or 
semi-presidential 
systems.
“dispersed nomenclature 
elites” 
nomenclature crumbled completely . had to 
compete for political power on equal footing 
with other political actors.   
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Parliamentarianism
“Consolidated 
nomenclatures” 
nomenclature suﬀered little fragmentation and 
maintained its dominance after 	
 independence. 
 
Kyrgyzistan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan
presidential 
The consolidated elites experience few cleavages or internal fragmentations. In these 
cases, “opposition forces are too weak to force old elites to alter the means of acquiring 
power” and these old elites are successfully able to retain their monopoly. Dispersed 
nomenclature elites experienced internal fragmentation during the breakdown phase, 
making it easier for opposition forces to mobilize mass support against them. As a result, 
these elites were forced to compete for power in the same manner as the new political 
actors in the transition phase. Finally, reformed elites went through a transition that 
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resembled a midpoint between the two processes described above. They did not come 
through the breakdown structurally intact, but they only have certain  internal 
fragmentation. Often such nomenclatures are forced to share power with the opposition. 
I combine Easters three categories from post-soviet studies with Moscas universal the-
ory to formulate a elite theory: The more fragmented (dispersed) the post-soviet elite is, 
the higher the liberalisation.  I use the three categories that Easter used. 
An important critique of the elite theory´s possibility to explain liberalisation is that it 
mixes cause and effect. If you regard that  political fragmentation is  liberalisation, then 
there is no causal relationship, only statistical. However the theory suggests that political 
fragmentation is the symptom of a society divided between elites, and I don´t define lib-
eralisation as a competition between elites, but as a set of civil and political liberties.  
Table 3.4. 2 NEW ELITES Elites as deﬁned by operationalisation  and #eedom rating, 2004 
E L I T E  F S U F R E E D O M
“Reformed old elite” (medium) Armenia, Ukraine, Georgia, Russia  Partially Free 
“dispersed nomenclature elites” (high) Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova Free
“Consolidated nomenclatures”  (low) Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, , Belarus 
Not Free
4.3.1  Comparing  the elite theory to Vanhanens IPR-theory, I regard elite theory as a 
certain political version of the economical and intelectual distribution of power. As 
political power has always been more concentrated in the area of the Russian empire 
(through politics of centralisation) this political distribution will be especially important 
in explaining liberalisation in FSU. Elites have traditionally had both political, 
economical and military power. The theory suggests that the more competing elites with 
political power, the more their will to accept political freedom with its minority rights as 
a way to secure themselves against the inﬂuence of the other elites, and a peaceful 
recruitment of government as  way to avoid costly conﬂicts.  However, under the 
existence of only one elite, the will to accept freedom is little, because they have control, 
and do not need political freedom to protect their power. While Vanhanens IPR 
measures elites in society as such (the distribution of economical and intelectual 
resources), the elite theory measures only political elites and the distribution of political 
power. Later I will discuss if they interact or measure the same phenomena. 
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4.4 Theory C. Diamonds model  - Development is Democracy  
 “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” 
Lipset, 1959.
“The higher the socio-economic development, the higher the political freedom”  This is 
the basic hypothesis  of the socioeconomic theory. Economic development as a structural 
precondition for a strong democracy is one of the most  classical theories in democracy 
theory. As  Burkhart and Beck note there are few “iron laws” in comparative politics, yet, 
one hypothesis that seems established beyond challenge is the causal link between 
economic development and democracy”.  Seymour Martin Lipset formulated the most 
inﬂuential piece on the development hypothesis  in  American Political Science Review 
in 1959 and his book in 1963:  “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it 
will sustain democracy”.  Lipset deﬁned well-to-do as a high level of economic 
development, measured in  national wealth and economic growth.   His and later scholars 
arguments were that  it creates better circumstances for a civil society to ﬂourish and a 
more moderate, patient  and tolerant population minimizing preferences for 
undemocratic solutions (Huntington 1991, Przeworski 1996). Lipset argued that  high 
economic growth safeguards democracies after a democratisation  has taken place, 
because it will increase, or at least not decrease, the legitimacy of the democratic regime. 
Economic crisis is expected to increase dissatisfaction among both the masses and 
powerful elites and thereby undermine the support for democracy and probably raise the 
longing for a strong man. Which could well be said, is what has happened in many FSU 
states where the economy often collapsed to half or a third of its former size and 
economic growth from that point of has been low, or negative in the ﬁrst ten years of 
democracy. 
The typical outlier in Lipset´s empirical data  were oil-rich Middle Eastern regimes: they 
were extremely  undemocratic, still they had high GDP. To answer this critique Diamond  
extended Lipset´s theory with redeﬁning well-to-do from  pure economic to   
socioeconomic development. He included factors such as health and  education. This 
explained why some well-to-do states didn´t democratize even when growing 
economically: because the development of economy was only beneﬁting certain layers or 
pockets in society:   “Oil rich states, whose economic and class structures are grossly distorted by the fact of 
centralized state control of the oil sector look economically developed in terms of their per capita income are much 
less so when 	
 we examine education levels, status of women, civic life, and state-society relations” (Diamond, 2003)
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Lipset and Diamonds theory will in my test be retranslated to the regional setting:   the 
more well-to-do the former Soviet republic (FSU),  the higher  political freedom (DS). 
Outliers can expected to be a case like Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan, where economical 
development has been high, because oil incomes booze GDP, but socioeconomic (health, 
education, average life span) has not. They are rich from oil - but it has not had any eﬀect 
on the political freedom -  maybe even  opposite: the income from oil has created a 
motive for the elites to remain in power, and more resources to do so. 
Lipset´s theory was more common in the 50s and 60s, but stil has supporters. Cutright, 
Diamond, Olsen,  Helliwell all  provided further support using multivariate correlations 
with larger numbers of countries. Adam Przeworski and his collaborators state that the 
“level of economic development has a very strong eﬀect on the probability that 
democracy will survive”  and  Samuel Huntington establishes a “coup-attempt ceiling,” 
beyond which military coups  are unlikely to happen, at a GNP of 3,000 USD per capita 
(Schedler, 2001: 73) Przeworski has shown statistical evidence for Lipset´s theory, but 
Przeworksi  did not suggest any causal relationship with high growth resulting in political 
freedom. Steven Fish´s empirical evidence shows   that there is only very weak 
correlation between HDI and the Freedom House Index  (Fish, 1998: 225-226).  
Lipset´s thesis has had to take critique for being valid only for Western states: since the 
relationship between development and democracy diﬀered on the variabel region. 
(Diamond, 2003: 93) and scholars have showed (like Huntington did on social peace in 
1968) how economic development has also proven to leads to lower levels of democracy 
for poor countries, especially when traditional, ingrained precondition change suddenly and 
ethnic and other divisions are strengthened. Coppedge challenged the modernisation 
theory that modernisation creates democracy by claiming it was diﬃcult to say which is 
cause and eﬀect: does urbanisation, spread of mass media and education boom explain 
democratisation or does democratisation explain modernisation.  Though, Coppedge, 
when testing his counter-theory concluded that the modernisation theory functioned 
also in other parts of the world than the West. (Vanhanen, 2003: 16)  I  include the 
socioeconomic theory in my analysis because  I believe the general income and social 
development could to be a  decisive  precondition for political freedom in general, and by 
testing it on the “post soviet lab” we can see if it is valid for this region. Rejections of 
Lipset´s theory on behalf of third world development countries does not necessarily 
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mean it can not apply to former socialist republics, of whom many have a high 
industrialisation and could be ranged “second world”, if one uses the term of graded 
worlds.  
4.5 Causal relations between independent variables 
The regression analysis will only show if there is statistic covariation between each 
independent variable and political freedom.  We can not prove causal relationship by 
statistics. The causal correlation i suggest between the independent and the dependent 
variabel  is based on the theoretical explanations given here. They live up to Mills three 
criteria for causal relations: the cause comes before the effect in time, there is a relation 
between them and that the relation remains when controlled for a third variabel (Lund, 
1996: 30)  IPR, Elite fragmentation and HDI are seen as phenomena coming first in 
time, and causing the level of political freedom, and even when controlled for a third 
variabel. 
Illustration 3. Towards a model of the theories. Suggested causal relation between the variables 
Towards a model. I believe they all independent variables have individually have causal 
effect on political freedom, but I wish to check for correlation between the the inde-
pendent variable IPR or HDI and elite. In my causal model, IPR is hinter-lying  factor, 
and elite fragmentation is probably related to  it. In the analysis I will test each theory 
single as a one-factor analysis. My prime hypothesis in the prospected model is that the 
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IPR is the most important explanatory factor, but that a fragmented elite can increase 
political freedom to a higher level then IPR suggests, and a that a consolidated elite will 
decrease the level of political freedom that the IPR suggests.
The theories are tested individually as they are expected to partially measure the same 
phenomenas, but in different ways. All theories include different ways of estimating 
distribution, but A has a economical focus, B a more general and C a political focus. It is 
likely to think that elite fragmentation will produce a distribution of power means, as 
each elite competes to get education or control of economic resources like land, capital 
and industry. The effect goes the other way too - if there is such a distribution, and an 
increase in division of labour, it will produce different elites.  Distribution of educational 
and economic powers are partially overlapping with the theory that a “well fed” 
population will liberalize a democracy, because distribution of economic power is parallel 
distribution of wealth. 
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5.  OPERATIONALISATION 
I have in the previous chapter presented and argued my theoretical framework and my 
choice of theories.  I will now present and argue my choice of operationalisations for the 
variabels.  
5.1 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
5.1. 2 Operationalisation  IPR
The operationalisation of the power resource theory will be Vanhanens IPR, which was 
well described in the presentation of the theory.  Alternative, possible operationalisations 
of power distribution could have been the  relative size of the middle class, degree of 
abscence/prescence of feudalism and levels of literacy. I have chosen Vanhanens Index of 
Power Resources (IPR)  because it contains several operationalisation of important  di-
mensions to economic and intellectual power  in one single index.   The six subindexes of 
IPR are divided in three sub-indexes: 
      Index of Occupation Diversification (IOD)1. 	
 urbanisation - percentage of population living in urban areas
2. 	
 agricultural dominance  - percentage of non-agricultural population
Index of Knowledge Distribution (IKD):
3. 	
 education level - number of students per 100 000 inhabitants
4. 	
 literaacy - percentage of populations with literacy
Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources (IDEPR)
5. 	
 selfowning peasants. percentage of share of family farms of the total area of holdings
6. 	
 degree of decentralisation of non-agricultural economic resources 
The source of  IPR will be the numbers Vanhanen use in 2003 (Vanhanen, 2003: 189-226), 
and they have not been updated in 2004,2005 or 2006, from what Mr. Vanhanen tells me 
by correspondence, because of the complexity by collecting the data for the indexes val-
ues.  For the table analysis, the IPR is converted into categories: High, medium and Low 
IPR.  Conversion is done of the basis of a scale from the IPR score of the  FSU with the 
highest (Latvia) and lowest value  (Uzbekistan) (38,3  and 5,7).  
 5.1. 3 Operationalisation - Nr of effective candidates
An alternative, possible operationalisation of fragmentation among post-soviet elites 
could be the institutional design (given that Easters theory was right), a estimation of 
Master thesis, Political science, University of Oslo, 2006	
 30
number of parties in parliament, the present role of USSR Communist Party (in or 
outside government, over or under 20% in parliament etc). Easter suggested  no other 
operationalisation of his theory  apart from his own assessment of case studying each 
FSUs political development.  However,  in order to use a more objective operationalis-
taion than assessment for the quantative data,  I have decided to measure the fragmenta-
tion of elites in the FSU by the effective number of presidential candidates in the most 
recent presidential election. This number reflect wether there is one, powerful elite in 
politics or several competing elites, de facto competing for power.   (If the country has 
one powerful elite, this will most probably be the nomenclature).    The eﬀective number 
of candidates is calculated as: , where “v” is the share of votes for each 
respective candidate “i” (in other words, it demonstrated how many “real” or 
“meaningful” candidates run in the election). The measure  was invented by Markku 
Laakso and Rein Taagepera (Laakso/Taagepera, 1979), and since then it used as a most 
conventional measurement of electoral competition. If there are four candidates, each of 
whom got 25% of votes, this meant that the eﬀective number of candidates is 4. If one of 
four candidates got 97% of votes, and three remaining candidates received 1% each, then 
the eﬀective number of candidates will be close to 1. 1 means a 100% vote for the 
president, which is what happened in Turkmenistan when the presidential candidate ran 
unopposed. 
This  independent variable  will be converted into categorical values
1 =  Eﬀective candidates in last presidential election > 2 = reformed elite  = 1 (high)  
2 = Eﬀective candidates in last presidential election 1,7-1,9 = reformed elite = 2
3 =  Eﬀective candidates in last presidential election > 1,7 = consolidated elite = 3
5.1.4 Operationalisation -   Human Development Index HDI
Possible operation of the socioeconomic development could by GNI and other pure 
economical indicators like debt or annual growth.  I choose UNDPs Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI).  The HDI – human development index – is a summary composite in-
dex that measures a country’s average achievements in three basic aspects of human de-
velopment: longevity, knowledge, and a decent standard of living.   
•Longevity =  life expectancy at birth (Source: UN Population Division)
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• Knowledge= combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, 
and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics)
•Standard of living =  GDP per capita (PPP US$).   (Source: World Bank)  
I have chosen operationlisation HDI because it includes all the important quantitative 
measures on living age, health condition, education and GNI and the index producer is 
reliable,  and especially reliable  for comparative analysis, as they have one global system 
of delivery of the data. The source is  UNDPs Human Development Report. For the 
regression analysis continuous values will be used. For the table analysis the HDI values 
will be converted into the categories high, medium and low. These categories are deﬁned 
inside a scale from the highest HDI score of a FSU to the lowest HDI score of a FSU.    
As the FSU HDI measured on a global scale ALL are relatively  low, the conversion is 
based on the size of the ﬁgures for the FSU countries. the HDI High are HDI-indexes 
above 0,8, medium are HDI-indexes 0,71- 0,79 and low are ,070 or lower. 
5.2 OPERATIONALISTAION DEPENDENT VARIABEL   
5.2.1 Operationalisation Freedom scale
How to measure political freedom?  The most famous  operationalisation is  Freedom 
House´s Freedom Scale. This scale is updated every year, and largely considered among the 
worlds most reliable, and often used for comparative analysis.   ( Dahl / Saphiro, 2002: 
530) An alternative, possible operationalisation could be the Polity 4 democracy barome-
ter. Polity 4 is a joint-scholar program that quantifies democracy on a scale from +10 to 
-10.  Dahl and Saphiro recommends also Polity 4, the  large disadvantage of the Polity 4 
is that it is not updated every year, and so this choice would have  forced my to “freeze” 
the data for all the dependent variables on to material published in  the year 2003 (date 
for 2002). Since then  two or three  “colour revolutions” have taken place after 2003, the 
2002-limit  is a clear  disadvantage, although Freedom House is not updated beyond De-
cember 30, 2004 either.  A second  acknowledged measurement for political freedom is 
the  the Democracy and Development (DD), developed by Preworski. DD is a a bicotom 
scale with values of either “democracy”  or “dictatorship”.  But DD is more  suitable for 
the transit to democracy than for the development after a system of elections for choos-
ing executive power has been installed, and the dichotomy of DD makes linear regression 
impossible and also there is the  internal FSU  differences.  
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I choose Freedom House scale. It is very precise measure according to  our definition of 
political freedom. Freedom House scale has both metric (Freedom scale) and non-metric 
values (Regime name). They are presented in this table: 
R E G I M E 
N A M E
F R E E D O M 
S C A L E 
D E F I N I T I O N S D E F I N I T I O N S
Consolidated 
Democracy 
1-2 Existence of policies that 
adhere to basic human rights 
standards, democratic norms, 
and the rule of law. 
 Existence of best practices that 
adhere to basic human rights 
standards, democratic norms, and the 
rule of law
Semiconsolidated 
Democracy 
3 Existence of policies that 
adhere to basic human rights 
standards, democratic norms, 
and the rule of law. 
Existence of most practices 
that adhere to basic human 
rights standards, democratic 
norms, and the rule of law
Transitional 
Government or 
Hybrid Regime 
4 Existence of many policies 
that adhere to basic human 
rights standards, democratic 
norms, and the rule of law. 
Existence of many practices 
that adhere to basic human 
rights standards, democratic 
norms, and the rule of law.
Semiconsolidated 
Authoritarian 
Regime 
5 Existence of many policies 
that adhere to basic human 
rights standards, democratic 
norms, and the rule of law. 
Existence of some practices 
that adhere to basic human 
rights standards, democratic 
norms, and the rule of law. 
Consolidated 
Authoritarian 
Regime
6-7 Existence of many policies 
that adhere to basic human 
rights standards, democratic 
norms, and the rule of law. 
 
7 Absence of policies that 
adhere to basic human rights 
standards, democratic norms, 
and the rule of law. 
Absence of many practices 
that adhere to basic human 
rights standards, democratic 
norms, and the rule of law. 
Absence of practices that 
adhere to basic human 
rights standards, democratic 
norms, and the rule of law.
5.3 SELECTION OF UNITS: UNIQUE FREEDOM LAB
The units studied will be the 15 former soviet unions republics: Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, operationalised  as the they are 
defined as members of the UN. Contested territories, like Transnistria in Moldova, 
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Abkazhia in Georgia and  Nagorno-Karabach in Azerbaijan and Armenia are excluded 
from the defintion of the units. Contested  areas often are rules by military law and 
technically they severely decreases the quality of political freedom in Moldova, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia if they count as parts of these units. (That they might have an 
indirect effect in political freedom in the uncontested area is still possible) Freedom 
House have separate country reports on these contested areas. By choosing all the FSUs 
the selection of units covers the complete universe of the research question. However, if 
we want to generalize from preconditions in the FSU to all post-authoritarian regimes 
with a democratic constitution, FSU as unit for study have to be discussed as a defective 
sample (ufullstendig utvalg). 
5.3.1 Arguing the units. The FSU a  lab for political freedom 
I have chosen the FSU because it is a unique lab for evaluating the democratic 
consolidation after transition from authoritarian regime to democracy. 15 states “started”  
from the same point of departure (with the Soviet legacy) in 1991.  As SSRs the post-
soviet heritage made them  so-called “most similar cases”. By comparing them on a 
liberalisation scala 15 years after transition to a (minimal defined) democracy we might  
achieve to identify the structural precondition for liberalisation. 
Soviet legacies - most similar case.  The important common Soviet heritages that 
made the FSU “most similar case” are  the one-party Leninist government model, the bu-
reaucratic state, centrally planned command economy with 5 years plans, massive collec-
tivization of agriculture, free mass education for all citizens, high welfare benefits-
regimes, Russianfication (or Sovietification) of non-Russian groups,  surveillance and in-
telligence institutions,  interpersonal distrust,  the threat of Gulag/prisoner camp for dis-
sidents, censorship of culture and media, use of mandatory participation in social organi-
zations + in mass education and  the ban on voluntary participation. During Stalin terror 
was used to force compliance with plan economy, and after end to terror method, plan-
ning economy was penetrated  by widespread corruption and bribery.  Soviet heritage 
should then be a relevant similarity when testing for power resource distribution, socio-
economic development and elite shifts.   
Post Communist heritage.   This Soviet heritage  also includes the more general post-
communist heritage, which is described by  Holmes in a 14 point-list on Eastern Euro-
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pean post-communist heritage: assertion of independence and rise of nationalism, near 
absence of a culture of compromise, high expectations of leaders, mistrust of political 
institutions, rejection of ideology & “grand theories”,  a total democracy and market 
economy transition (as opposed to South Europe’s political & not economical or Chinas 
economical & not political), a feeling of temporality while the population awaits transi-
tion into  something else other  than post-communism, political instability and frequent 
reforming and change amongst the elite, a widespread sense if insecurity, and legitimation 
problems for the new political elite. (Holmes, 1997: 17-19) . Holmes also point out the fea-
ture of  Eastern European transitions that is came sudden  and parallel with a  economic 
cool-down in the West. Tucker agreed that the Soviet heritage was more than just a  his-
tory, it was reflected in the way of thinking, and affected all 15 states, even after inde-
pendence (Tucker, 1995:237).   
5.3.2 Arguing the 15 unit-choice   Critique could be leveled against choosing all the 15 
FSU for comparative analysis. The most common objection is that the  Baltics reached 
autonomy already at the late phase of Soviet history and have been under EU “protec-
tion” - sharing close toes immediately after independence,  while other FSUs have not.  
Historically it is argued that Baltics, Western Ukraine and Moldova joined the USSR as  
occupied territories, while most of rest where parts of the former Russian empire. An-
other difference some would argue is unreasonable to compare them on has to do with 
level of modernization. Russia, Ukraine and  Belarus are industrialized on a “second 
world standard” while most Central Asian states have third-world agricultural economies. 
Nevertheless, all of the states emerged in 1991 from a highly centralized unitary system of 
Leninism and democratized simoultainously.  The Baltics are also  interesting cases, or 
“mirrors” to the mainstream development  in FSU.  Excluding deviant cases in the lower 
part of the scale, like Belarus, or deviant cases as the Baltics in the higher part of the 
scale,   would be to trying to adapt the landscape after the map, instead of adapting a map 
to the landscape.  The theories try to define the variation of DS in the FSU, because 
FSUs Soviet heritage is a unique opportunity  for comparing democracies.
5.3.3 Country background
The empirical data presented for my study  is primarily bases on Country Reports from 
Freedom House Country Reports 2005 and Vanhanens book on IPR and Election results 
from www.electionworld.org and Erik Herron´s article 2002. The country background is 
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from Freedom House Country Reports 2005 and  Freedom House “Worst of the Worst”, 
2004 and (where reference is given)   certain quoted encyclopedias. Freedom House 
Country Reports 2003 and 2005  and The Europa World Year Book 2004  is the main 
source, and will not be quoted in the text. 
 Lithuania  
Population: 3,500,000  Capital: Vilnius 	

History: The state Lithuania merged with Poland in the sixteenth century and was subsequently 
absorbed by Russia in the 18th century. After gaining its independence at the end of World War I, 
Lithuania was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1941 under the Molotov-Ribbentrop-pact. 
Independence regained 1991, but certain autonomy granted even earlier. 
Post-soviet:  Lithuania became a EU member in May 2004 after referendum.  
Democracy conclusion: Lithuanians can change their government democratically.  
 Lativa 
Population: 2,300,000     Capital: Riga 
History: As the Estonians and the Lithuanians,  Latvians have been  a distinct ethnic group at the 
Baltic coast with their own language for centuries. However the territory has mostly had foreign 
rulers since Swedish invasion in the 17th Century. It was part of the Russian empire in the 18th 
and 19th Century and became independent in modern times only in 1917. Latvia was re-annexed 
by Russians to the USSR in 1941, and re-emerged as independent in 1991. 
Post-soviet: Latvia ascended to the  EU in 2004 after a referendum.   
Democracy conclusion: Latvians can change their government democratically. 
Estonia
Population: 1,400,000 	
 Capital: Tallin
History: Estonia has had many rulers: Swedes, Germans and Russian. After gaining its 
independence from Russia in 1918, Estonia was re-occupied by the U.S.S.R. in 1941 and annexed. 
Approximately 1/10 of the population was deported, executed, or forced to ﬂee abroad during the 
50 years of occupation by USSR.  When reaching independence in 1991,  ethnic Estonians 
constituted only  60%  of the population. 
Post-soviet: Estonia joined the EU in 2004.  Like other Baltic regimes, - after fall of Communism 
most of the nomenclature was shifted out and the former Communist party is marginalised. Until 
2004 Estonia kept low rating because the Russian part of the population was not included in the 
political process. 
Democracy conclusion: Estonians can change their government democratically
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Moldova
Population: 4,300,000    Capital: Chisinau
Hisotry: Moldova did not exist as a state until Stalin took then-called landscape of Bessarabia 
from Romania during WW2 and created the Moldovian SSR. 
Post-soviet: Independence was declared in 1991, but a separat part of the country, Transnistria has 
not accepted the independence, and remains de facto autonomous.  As discussed under units, we 
will here consider Moldova as the unit disregarding the contested territory.  Moldova in 2001 
became the ﬁrst FSU to democratically elect a Communist Party member as president.   Some 
meant the  return of Communists to power by democratic means oﬀered some prospects for 
long-term democratic consolidation. (Demokratizatsiya; 9/22/2004; March, Luke ), but other has 
seen a worsening of political freedom in Moldova since Communist take-over, including the ban 
of opposition party and closure of free media. (Way, Luke, Journalist of democracy 13.4, 2002)  
Freedom House concludes Moldova has not made the kind of substantial progress toward stable 
democracy seen in some of its Western neighbors. Frequent changes in political leadership have 
impeded the development of consistent and effective policies. Local elections held nationwide in 2003 
were declared by the OSCE to be in line with international standards, but some observers expressed 
concerns about intimidation of opposition candidates, bias among the media, and irregularities during 
the poll. Democracy conclusion: It is doubtful wether Modlovans can or can not change their 
government democratically. 
Ukraine 
Population: 47,800,000 Capital: Kyiv
History: Ukraine  was an independent state in mediaeval times. Due to pressure on its borders 
from diﬀerent enemies Ukraine was forced to become a part of the Russian empire in the 17th 
Century, and gained its ﬁrst independence in modern times  in 1991.  
Post-soviet: Ukraine is in many ways similar to Russia: a populous nation (48 million), vast 
territory (similar to that of France), a Slavic language and Byzantine-Inﬂuenced Christianity 
(Russian Orthodox, Ukrainian Orthodox and Greek Catholicism). The national-minded 
nomenclature in Western and Central Ukraine that got their hands on nationalised property 
(taken from Soviet).  The Russian-minded elites in the East of Ukraine were content to have their 
hands on Soviet property like Crimea and industrial wealth. Dawisha/Parrot Demo. 1997:345) 
Democracy conclusion: Since the “orange revolution” Ukrainian voters have been able to change 
their government democratically, in 2004. Ukraine’s civil liberties rating improved from 4 to 3 
due to increases in media independence and associational rights resulting from widespread civic 
mobilization protesting fraudulent elections in November.
Russia
Population: 145,500,000   Capital: Moscow 
History: Russia traces its roots as a state back to the centuries before 1000 AD, with the original 
state being based in Kiev, which today is in Ukraine. Russia  became an empire under tsar Peter I, 
expanding rapidly in territory and military size. After the 1917 October revolution Russia became 
the core state of the Soviet Union, and the dominant actor in the Union until the break-up in 
1991. Russia was ruled as monarchy by tsars until 1917 and was under Communist centralist 
one-party rule (tsar or Communist Party) until 1991, when the ﬁrst constitutional multiparty 
democracy was established (apart from the february to october  1917). 
Post-soviet:    Russia was ruled by president Yeltsin for two periods 1991-96, 1996-99, and his 
sucessor Putin from 1999 to elections in 2000. Putin was elected president twice, in 2000 and 2004. 
During 2004, President Vladimir Putin took further steps toward the consolidation of executive 
authority by increasing pressure on opposition political parties and civil society, strengthening state 
control over national broadcast media, and pursuing politically-driven prosecutions of independent 
business leaders and academics. In the March 2004 presidential election, Putin easily defeated his 
closest challenger with more than 70 percent of the vote. The 2000 and 2004 presidential vote and, 
even more so, the  2003 Duma elections was marred by irregularities. Next elections are in 2008. 
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Democracy conclusion: Russian can not change their government democratically, particularly in 
light of the state’s far-reaching control of broadcast media and growing harassment of opposition 
parties and their ﬁnancial backers, of local governments and recently the NGOs.  Russia’s 
political rights rating declined from 5 to 6 on the Freedom Scale, and its status from Partly Free 
to Not Free, due to the virtual elimination of inﬂuential political opposition parties within the 
country and the further concentration of executive power. 
Armenia
Population: 3,200,000    Capital: Yerevan
History: Armenia is a ancient kingdom and long-time independent Caucasus country, 
predominately Christian in Muslim region. Armenia was conquered by Russia in the 19th century. 
Post-soviet: After independence it maintains strong bonds to Russia, amongst others military 
alliance and Russian soliders on Armenian soil, due to the military challenges of war  within the 
borders and with neighbours. Armenia also maintains good relations with the European Union, 
due to its geographical proximity.   
Democracy conclusion: Armenians can not change their government democratically. The 1995, 1996, 
1999 and 2003 elections  were strongly criticized by international election monitors. 
Georgia
Population: 4,700,000	
 	
 	
 Capital: Tbilisi
History: Georgia  traces its root as a state back to ancient kingdoms and is  united by the 
Georgian Orthodox church at the border regions between Christianity and Islam. Asking security 
from the Mongolian and Muslim invaders, Georgia signed a pact with the Russian tsar in the 19th 
Century and was later included into the Russian Empire.  (Dawisha/Parrot, 1997:157) Georgia 
became independent for a short period from 1917 to 1921.  
Democracy conclusions: Citizens in Georgia can change their government democratically. Still 
ethnic, clan and personality struggles continue to deﬁne Georgian politics.  International 
observers  noted signiﬁcant voting irregularities at elections in 2003 and thousands of protesters 
took to the  streets and forced a regime change, in the so-called “Rose revolution”. Mikhail 
Saakashvili, a long-time critic of the Shevardnadze government won the January 2004 
presidential  election with 96% of the vote. This “colour revolution” happened at the end of 2003, 
but is not reﬂected in the democracy scores of Georgia. The fact that Georgias last presidential 
election had such a high score - 96% for one candidate, makes it look as a very consolidated elite 
while in-fact this number represent a elite shift. 
Kyrgyzstan
Capital: Bishkek         Population: 5,000,000
History: Kyrgyz are historically horse-breeding, mountain-dwelling nomads, the Turkic-speaking 
descendants of the Mongol invaders who swept across Asia from the 13th century.  A  1000 year 
old Mana legend of  a leader who united all  Kyrgyz tribes is the only record of a Kyrgyz state 
before independence in 1991 (Huskey, in Dawisha/Parrot, 1997: 242)  The Kyrgyz area was 
annexed by Russia in 1864 and became a separat SSR in 1936. (Hutchington, 2003) 
Post-soviet: Kyrgyzstan´s “strong man” 1990-2005 was president Akayev.  In 2003 Kyrgyz could not 
change their government democratically.   Since the elite from Soviet times remained largely in 
power in 2004, Kyrgyzstan is considered a consolidated elite in our data- but this rapidly changed 
in 2005, when Akayev was ousted from power in Elections in February and after  mass riots 
regarding electoral fraud. This showed that Kyrgyz can change their government democratically. 
Kazakhstan 
Population: 14,800,000       Capital: Astana
History: Kazakhstan is a predominately Muslim country in Central Asia.  Darwish claims it is a  
“accidental country, a nation carved out of a Soviet republic whose boundaries where never 
intended to be those of a independent state. “ (Olcott, in Darwish/Parrot, 1997:201) The areas 
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which to today is Kazakhstan were for centuries rulerd by leaders, kahns,  of the three major 
hordes. The area was incorporated into Russian in the late 19th century as the republic of 
Turkestan. 
Post-soviet: Almost 40% of the population is ethnic Russian, and the previously poor state is 
becoming rich from oil wealth onshore and in the Caspian Sea.  There has been no change in 
executive leadership in post-independence Kazakhstan. State leader is  President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev; Chairman of the Supreme Soviet since 1990; ﬁrst elected president 1991; reelected 
1999 and 2005.  The pre-Communist and post-Communist elite remain in general the same, and 
so elite power is consolidated. Independent political parties continue to elect small numbers of 
deputies to the legislature (Polity 4, Cook, 2004/ Darwish/Parrot, 1997:201)
Democracy conclusion: Kazakhstan citizens can not change their governmental democratically.
Tajikistan
Population: 6,600,000	
 	
 	
 Capital: Dushanbe 
History: Conquered by Russia in the late 1800s, Tajikistan shares borders with the unstable state 
of Afghanistan, and Tajiks is a ethnic group living both in Tajiikstan and Afghanistan. Tajikistan 
was made an autonomous region within Uzbekistan in 1924 and a separate SSR 1929. 
Post-soviet: After independence in 1991, long-simmering clan-based tensions, combined with 
various anti-Communist and Islamist movements, soon plunged the country into a ﬁve-year civil 
war for central government control. 
 Over 60,000 Tajiks were killed and over 10% of the population was internally displaced. Zones 
are still left where armed bands terrorize the population at will. 
Democracy conclusion:  Citizens of Tajikistan cannot change their government democratically. 
Elections in Tajikistan remain simply a legitimizing ritual.  Emomali Rahmonov was  initially 
elected in 1992; reelected 1999 and enforced his power trough a referendum in 2003. 
Azerbaijan
Population: 8,200,000      Capital: Baku
History: Azerbaijan is a pre-dominantly Muslim country with rich oil resources in the caspian sea 
and onshore. Its present territories were conquered by Russia in the 19th Century, and it never 
enjoyed independence as a modern state before 1991. 
Post-soviet: Azerbaijan maintains relative good relations with the EU and Russia, mainly because 
of oil interests,  despite of a war with Armenia.  Citizens of Azerbaijan cannot change their 
government democratically.  In 1992, Abulfaz Elchibey was elected president in a generally free 
and fair vote, but ousted by military coup in 1993, directed by the former ﬁrst secretary of the 
Azerbaijan Communist Party, Heydar Aliev, who rigged presidential elections in 1993 where he 
claimed a 99% electoral victory. The 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2003 elections were considered 
neither free nor fair by international observers. The older Aliev has passed the power on to his 
son, Ilham Aliyev, who ascended to the presidency in late 2003, attempt to put his mark on 
Azerbaijani politics and consolidate his power base among the country’s ruling elite. Aliyev won 
elections in 2005, though riots after allegations of electoral fraud were cracked down on with 
police. 
Belarus 
Population: 9,900,000	
	
 Capital: Minsk 
History: Belarus became independent first time in 1918, but soon incorporated in USSR. Belarus is a 
state who shares common features with Russia and Ukraine (Slavic ethnicity and language, Orthodox 
church) but has its proper language.
Post-soviet:  Close ties are maintained with Russia, especially after 1994 elections of president 
Lukaschenko, which led to Belarus´ expulsion from the Council of Europe.  Belarus has unlimited 
presidential authority after amendments to the Constitution in 1996. The government preserves social 
stability through welfare policies that provide the population with minimally acceptable living 
standards. the  state-bureaucratic elite forms the basis of Lukashenka’s regime, providing “the two 
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pillars of presidential power - collective farms and collective labor in state-run enterprises.”  (FH) 
Demonstrations against electoral fraud after the presidential election in March 2006 were violently 
cracked down on. (press, 2006)
Democracy conclusion: Citizens of Belarus can not change their government democratically. 
 Turkmenistan 
Population: 5,700,000     Capital: Ashgabat
History: Turkmenistan was conquered by the Mongols in the 13th century and seized by Russia in 
the late 1800s, incorporated into the U.S.S.R. in 1924. 
Post-soviet: President Saparmura Niyazov has  governed Turkmenistan SSR since 1985. He became 
president in 1990,  elected in 1992 and announced president-for-life in 1999. President Niyazov 
maintains a personal monopoly on power through  political repression and constitutional 
manipulation and has taken the name “Turkobash” ; father of the Turk nation.  He decides what 
books to read in the schools, and even changed the calendar to his own liking. 
Democracy conclusion: Turkumen citizen can not change their government democratically.  
Freedom House lists Turkmenistan amongst the 15 less free countries in the world.  The regime 
ban all political parties, enjoys complete control over the media, censoring all newspapers and 
forbidding independent criticism of government policy. Elections are not considered free or fair, 
and neither the reformed Communist Party (stil in power), the legislative, nor the judiciary has 
any signiﬁcant autonomy from the executive branch. 
Uzbekistan 
Population: 25,700,000	
 	
 Capital: Tashkent
History: Located along the Silk Road, Uzbekistan was incorporated into Russia by the late 1800s. 
Uzbekistan SSR was established in 1924. Citizens of Uzbekistan cannot change their government 
democratically. President Islam Karimov and the executive branch dominate the legislature and 
judiciary,  military, and  security police. Elected in 1991 and  reelected with 92% of the votes in 
1999.  Open and free private discussion is limited by the mahalla committees, a traditional 
neighborhood organization that the government has turned into an oﬃcial system for public 
surveillance and control. The country’s best known opposition parties have been banned.  
Rebellion against the government in May 2005 was cracked down upon by military forces. 
American criticism of this act led to expulsion from the military bases in 2005/2006.(Press, 2006) 
5.3.4  Patterns in country background 
Some interesting notes on the FSU is that on most measures of democracy,  Latvia, Esto-
nia and Lithuania score on the high ends of scales, while all Central Asian states,and Be-
larus and Azerbaijan score in the low end of the scale.  The same pattern is seen in the 
variation of IPR, although not for Belarus and Azerbaijan. Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Ar-
menia and Belarus often come in the “middle” of scales, wether it bee democracy ba-
rometers, GDP, IPR or other measure.  The Baltic states and Moldova came  latest to the 
USSR and left fastest. They and Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia all share the fact 
that they have a pre-Soviet experience of an independent state and all, apart from 
Moldova, has a majority of the name-bearing ethnical group (similar to stateness defini-
tion). Only the Baltic states and Russia had independence in the 20th century before the 
collapse of the USSR in  1991. 
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Another important diﬀerence lies in the GNI, the “middle countries” mentioned are 
often middle income countries, while Central Asian are low income-countries. For 
industrialisation no statistics is provided by the data, but it is possible to imagine that 
the higher-income countries, apart from a “oil eﬀect” on Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, are 
more industrialised than the low-income countries. 
Three of the the ﬁve  Central Asian republics have the same head of state as in 1991. 
The Borders of the Central Asian republics in the 1920s were neither national,  ethnic, 
linguistic, or cultural borders. (Bendersky, 2005). Note also: Tajikistan experienced a 
vicious civil war from 1992-1996, and also Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Armenia 
have war experiences in the 1990s. 
Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgistan have experienced so-called “colored revolutions” be-
tween December 2003 and February 2005. In my data this can not be reflected in Kyrgyz-
stan, unfortunately.  Russia has fallen lately, under Putin´s second term starting 2004, be-
cause of new legislation that decreases freedom of speach and the limitations on execu-
tive power. 
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6.  EMPIRICAL DATA 
6.1 Table QUANTATIVE  DATA  Summary of data, 2004 
FSU Index of Power 
resources 
Freedom 
scale
NR. OF 
EFFECTIVE 
CANDIDATES 
LAST ELECTION
YEAR OF LAST 
PRESIDENTI
AL ELECTION 
UNTIL 30.12 .04
Human 
Development 
Index 2005
Armenia 25,2 5,18 2,96 (3,64) 2003 (1999) 0,76
Azerbaijan 17,8 5,86 1,63 ( 1,67) 2003 (1999) 0,73
Belarus 7,7 6,64 1,39 2001 0,79
Estonia 36,5 1,96 5,55* - 0,85
Georgia 33,7 4,96 1,084 (1.5) 2003 (2000) 0,71
Kazakhstan 15,5 6,29 1,41 1999 0,76
Kyrgyzstan 11,6 5,64 1,73 2000 0,7
Latvia 38,3 2,14 5.49* - 0,84
Lithuania 34,7 2,21 3.27 1998 0,85
Moldova 16,7 5,07 1,85* - 0,67
Russia 19,7 5,6 1,89 (2,7) 2004 (2000) 0,80
Tajikistan 6,6 5,79 1, 06 1999 0,65
Turkmenistan 6,7 6,93 1 1994 0,76
Ukraine 20,1 4,5 3,13 (4,66) 2004 (1999) 0,77
Uzbekistan 5,7 6,43 1,18 2000 0,69
Sources:   Freedom House Country Report  2005.  IPR Tatu vanhanen 2003.   
*- Not presidential, but parliamentary elections (not included in linear regression)  
The year of last election is only included for background. 
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6.2 Summary of all variables for table analysis
F S U Index of 
power 
resources 
H U M A N  
D E V E L O P
M E N T 
I N D E X 
2 0 0 5
E L I T E 
F R A G M E N
T A T I O N
REGIME TYPE FREEDOM 
SCALE
Estonia high high Dispersed Consolidated Democracy 1,96
Latvia high high Dispersed Consolidated Democracy 2,14
Lithuania high high Dispersed Consolidated Democracy 2,21
Ukraine medium low Dispersed Hybrid Regime 4,5
Georgia high low Consolidated* Hybrid Regime 4,96
Moldova medium low Reformed Semiconsolidated 
Authoritarian 
5,07
Armenia medium low Dispersed Semiconsolidated 
Authoritarian 
5,18
Russia medium low Reformed Semiconsolidated 
Authoritarian 
5,6
Kyrgystan low low Reformed Semiconsolidated 
Authoritarian 
5,64
Tajikistan low low Consolidated Semiconsolidated 
Authoritarian 
5,79
Azerbaijan medium low Consolidated Semiconsolidated 
Authoritarian 
5,86
Kazakhstan medium low Consolidated Consolidated 
Authoritarian 
6,29
Uzbekistan low low Consolidated Consolidated 
Authoritarian 
6,43
Belarus low low Consolidated Consolidated 
Authoritarian 
6,64
Turkmenistan low low Consolidated Consolidated 
Authoritarian 
6,93
Conversion:   as Freedom Houses conversion.  
Elite fragmentation Dispersed > 3   Reformed 1,7 - 2,99  Consolidated < 1,69
IPR converted  : High > 19      Low < 19   
HDI converted into dichotomies as UNDP measures it. < 0,8 is high    > 0,8 is low 
Sources:  Freedom House, country reports 2005. Nations in transit, 2004 .  IPR =  Tatu vanhanen 2003.  
* Technicaly, Georgia rates as consolidated because the number of effective candidates is close to 1. The 
winning president got 96% of the votes. But we have to remember that this is the “Rose revolution”, and in 
the second round, the real opposer, the old regime, was not running at all. 
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7.  RE SEARCH DE SIGN 
& METHODOLOGY 
The data is analysed by linear regression, cross tabulation and simple table analysis.  The 
draft for an eventual model is evaluated by a causal analysis. The correlations between the 
variables was calculated by SPSS, and gave us the following correlation matrix, from 
which I decided what methods to run for analysis. However, only the IPR theory and the 
Elite theory seem significant.  The causal effect by HDI is proved insignificant by the 
correlation matrix (0,056 is higher then the 005 level), so regression will not be run for 
HDI. 
The correlation matrix also show that there  is a strong correlation the  independent var-
ibles between (0,59 /  0,46  / 0,62).  This means that a multivariat analysis by regression 
would be insignificant. Consequenstly I  can not test a joint model of the variables by 
multivariat  regression. This correlation between the independent variables was to be 
expected from the  theoretical review. As mentioned the Elite fragmentation factor is a 
form of “political IPR”, while IPR is a form of “economical elite fragmentation”, and 
both Human development index and IPR measure (by diﬀerent means) the levels od 
education, - which are similar all trough the post-soviet space. A consolidated elite might 
be  able to prevent the HDI and IPR to increase by redestributing values to the elites 
from the state (cleptocracy) instead of general distribution, and this can explain why elite 
fragmentation is correlated with both IPR and HDI. Only if the correlation between the 
independen varibales was zero or low, could a multivariat analysis be run for all together. 
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According to the causal model suggested I will run a causal analysis of IPRs effect on 
Freedom, controlled for elite fragmentation and socioeconomic level. 
Regression
A linear regression would tell us how many of the units in the sample the variable is able 
to explain.  For a one-factor analysis we need the residual to be normally redistributed.  
The PP plot show that they are for variabel A and C. 
Bivariate relations and causal analysis 
Since the independent variables show correlation between eachother, we need to use  the 
bivariate correlations  instead of multivariat regression to determine the strength of the 
correlations of an eventuell joint model, like suggested in illustration 3.   
Simple table analysis
The number of cases in the sample are only 15. Therefor I have made conversion of the 
continuos, metric values for elite and IPR (which passed the test of being signiﬁcant 
theories on the model)  into excluding nominal categories with three values: high medium 
low. From this table, with a low number of N, and a clear tendency in the units, it is 
possible to extract information on both of the independent variables., even without 
procentuation, 
8 .  THE ANALYSIS 
In the analysis chapter I will test the three operationalised theories effect on the opera-
tionalised  freedom in the FSU, using the data and the methodology presented in chapter 
6 and 7.  First I present the results from the regressions, then I use bivariate relations to 
run a causal anlysis of the suggested model. 
8.1 Test for requirements.   A mentioned, the correlation of  HDI (Human) and Free-
dom  is higher than the critical value of significance. Therefore I will run regression only 
on theory A and C. 
8.2 Independent variable IPR on Freedom 
H0: there is no correlation between  high degree of IPR and high  political freedom (closer to 7)
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Covariation.  IPR theory shows strong covariation with the dependent variable. The R-
square for IPRs explanatory power on political freedom is 0,778, and 0,761 for adjusted 
R-square1. Both indicate a very strong covariation between IPR and Freedom.  Signifi-
cance: IPR theory is statistically significant. the t value is -6,7. 
In social science this as strong covariation, and the result is significant.  The result is also 
not far from the results Vanhanen reached when explaining the entry of democratisation 
in 177 countries. It strengthens both  hypothesizes of theory A.  
Discussion of outliers.   The case-wise diagnostics of IPRs eﬀect on PF  explain very 
precisely, apart from Georgia, Kazakhstan and Armenia (too little freedom) and Estonia, 
Tajikistan and Lithuania (too much freedom). Especially Georgia remains a mystery . 
That means that if we know the value of theory A we still don´t automatically know the 
value of PF.  (this is interesting because when testing for Polity 4 democracy 2003 the 
unexplained were not only Georgia, but also Russia and Ukraine. These have fallen and 
risen on Freedom barometer since 2003 - and this could explain the diﬀerence.) 
Conclusion A  on correlation IPR- Freedom:  H0 was dicarded. The same impression as 
the regression results give, can be  observed in the table of Strata: Low IPR  consequently 
gives Low freedom, High IPR gives consequently high freedom and Medium IPR gives 
mediary freedom. All Consequently. 
8.3 Socioeconomic theory 
Regression was not  run for  the effect of HDI on Freedom, as the correlation was not 
significant. 
Master thesis, Political science, University of Oslo, 2006	
 46
1 R-square  close to 1.00 indicates a very strong relationship between y and the x variables. If R-square is near 0.00 y is 
not explained by the x’s, hence R-square near 0.00 means no distinguishable pattern between the given explanatory 
variable and the dependent variabel.
 Conclusion B:  Correlation  indicates in a weak relationship and it is not significant. 
H0 was strengthed: there is no causal relationship between HDI and political freedom in 
the FSU.  
8.4 Fragmentation of elite 
H0: there is no correlation between countries with a high  Elite fragmentation (Elite) and high political 
freedom (closer to 7)
Covariation. Elite fragmentation theory shows weak correlation with the dependent 
variable. The R-square for Elite fragmentations explanatory power on political freedom is 
0,596 and 0555 for adjusted R-square. For a correlation in social science it is still a valid 
result, and the t-value of -3,8 show that the theory is statistically significant. An impor-
tant notice is that N for this regression was only 12, because my operationalisation of 
elite fragmentation  excluded the parliamentary Latvia, Lithuania and Moldovas lack of 
presidential elections since -96. The case-wise diagnostics show that Georgia and 
Lithuania have more freedom then explained by the elite fragmentation. Especially 
Georgia, and this is a result of the operationalisation where high shares for one candidate 
indicates uniﬁed elite. Ironicly, when an old elite was dispersed in Georgia in 2003, the 
opposition  candidate won by landslide - which gave Georgia the label consolidated elite, 
while the correct would probably have been dispersed. Armenia remains a mystery.  A 
reason why elite theory shows so little correlation could also be because of an invalid 
operationalistaion- maybe the number of eﬀective candidate is misleading indicator. The 
other explenation could be because three countries which would have been explained by 
this precondtion, were left out. 
Conclusion C. H0 is discarded, but the proven correlation is  not convincingly strong . 
Political  elite fragmentation is a major force in explaining variation of political freedom 
in the FSU. The data matrix  confirms that the findings only work for high values. Low 
values (consolidated elites) explain both authoritarian regime and  crossroad, and regimes 
wit a medium elite Unless Georgia counts for dispersed elite after Rose revolution, Re-
formed elite give medium political freedom, meaning all medium elites give medium 
freedon. But consolidated elites give both low and medium freedom, and dispersed elites 
give both democracies (baltics) and crossroad regimes: Armenia and Ukraine. 
Table DATA MATRIX IPR and ELITE on FREEDOM
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I P R I P R I P R
High Medium Low
ELITE
Dispersed Reformed Consoli
dated
Dispersed Reformed Consolidated Dispers
ed
Refor
med 
Consolidated
Democracy Estonia, 
Latvia, 
Lithuania
Crossroad Georgia Ukraine, 
Armenia
Kyrgyz, 
Moldova, 
Kazakhst, 
Russia
Azerbaijan, 
Tajikistan, 
Authoritarian Belarus, 
Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan
The units  placed on their values for IPR and Elite. The scheme shows that high IPR and dispersed elites  are  
connected with Democracy (High on the Freedom scale). Medium IPR and Reformed elites are (except Geor-
gia) connected with Crossroad regimes - semi-democratic and semiauthoritaruan. Low IPR is connected with 
authoritarian forms of democracies (low on Freedom). Consolidated elites are found both at crossroad regimes 
and authoritarian.
Source: Dataset. 
Political freedom   1- 3 consolidated and semi-consolidated democracy as  high = 1 Democracy
4-5 hybrid regimes and semi-consolidated authoritarian regime as medium = 2 Crossroad
6-7 Consolidated authoritarian regime =  3  Authoritarian 
8. 5 Analysis of case-wise diagnostics 
After regression and cross tabulation I have left HDI theory out of the model. How can 
IPR and Elite fragmentation combined explain the preconditions for FSU countries? 
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 Right: Elite fragmentation
We will need to use causal anlaysis to find the question, but the case-wise diagnostics do 
give an indicator. Elite theory seems to “correct” IPR in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan, in the sense that where IPR predicts the Political freedom score to be 
higher than measured,  the elite fragmentation suggests that the political freedom score 
to be lower, and vise versa. This indicates that elite fragmentation could be explanatory in 
combination with IPR theory, atleast for these units.  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus Ka-
zakhstan and Turkmenistan all score worse than IPR predicts.  Especially Armenia. 
Lithuania and  Tajikistan are more free than predicted, especially Tajikistan. Elite theory 
can not explain Armenia either. 
In sum IPR has a high predictability in level of political freedom. In Ukraine, Georgia, 
Uzbekistan’s and Kyrgyzstan IPR and elite fragmentation works together. In the other 
cases the deviation from IPR must be explained by other factors, and elite theory, as op-
erationalised here, seems to only be a explanatory precondition for certain countries. 
8. 6  Causal  analysis  - Interaction between independent variables
Returning to our causal model I wish to measure the combined explanatory strength of 
the eﬀects of the two signiﬁcant theories, IPR and Elite. IPR is the hinter-lying factor in 
the model because it is reasonable to believe (with a structural, materialist perspective) 
that a wide distribution of economical resources will have certain inﬂuence on the 
fragmentation of elites: if resources are scattered on many hands, the more chanse elites 
will derive in diﬀerent spheres of the specialised economy, or atleast that the distribution 
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will empower eventual groups that diﬀer from the politically ruling elite, turn them into 
elites, and this create fragmentation. Elites can also appear from other source, such as 
cultural, language or other sources of societal cleavages. For instance if the IPR reﬂects 
the establishment of new agricultural industry,  which gives rise to a new elite, in 
opposition to the old heavy-industrial elite in power. From the bivariate correlations of 
the operationalised variables we can calculate wether IPR has more eﬀect  on Freedom 
alone or in combination with elite fragmentation and socioeconomic development. The 
latter showed no statistically signiﬁcant bivariate correlation with Freedom, so it will be 
left out of the model. This illustraton shows the joint eﬀect on freedom  of the IPR and 
the elite fragmentations theory  in something that coul be a model. 
I$ustration 4. Causal anlaysis chart, the outline of a IPR -Elite model
Explanations of causal analysis.  The total eﬀect of the model is IPR and Elite 
fragmentation on political freedom (sum of directe and indirect eﬀects. Direct Eﬀects = 
Bivariat correlations (BC) minus indirect eﬀects. Indirect eﬀect (0,4) is the BC of  IPR 
-Elite multiplied with Elite -Freedom. If HDI constituted a spurious eﬀect it would have 
been (Total eﬀect minus Indirect eﬀect). However, there was no correlation between 
HDI and Freedom. (Lund, 1993) From this table we can conclude  that even if there is a 
certain “overlapping”, interaction, between IPR theory and Elite fragmentation that 
makes it impossible to run them together in a multivariate analysis, there might be an 
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increased explanation from combing the theories. The model tells us this because the 
Indirect eﬀect of the hinter-lying IPR to Freedom over Elite fragmentation  (0,4)  is 
larger than the direct eﬀect of IPR to Freedom.  	

8. 7 Validity of the test
Our  study is in general valid,  but suffer from certain weaknesses. Important to have in 
mind is that generalisitions from the conclusion on FSU  to all transitory  regimes might 
not be very valid (outer validity of the data)  given what I have described as the post-
soviet heritage.  
 Datas validity is constituted by the reliability of the data and the validity of the 
operationalisation. The major danger of an invalid operationalisation is to operationalise 
something that does not reflect the theoretical size it is suppose to represent. 
Defintional invalidity  is probably biggest for theory C, elite, because it is highly 
questionable  if the political competation in a given election is enough to measure the 
fragmentation of an elite. What if there is, but they dont compete on the political scene, 
or one elite is totally outrun in one election, like in Georgia in 2003.  The defintional 
validity of A and B are higher. In general they and the dependent variabels defintion have 
few validity problems in the transformation from theoretical term to operationalistaion 
(empirical data). For one, they are all indexes, with several dimension,s and they are well 
theoretisized about and argued for in the litterature where they are presentend. 
Inner validity. Even if statistically significant, the test can suffer from inner validity. 
For instance, as simple as the fact that  there is no causal relationship between the depend-
ent and independent variable. There could also be causal relationship, but it apperad 
weaker than real, because of a factor in history which now is gone. (Lund, 1996:23). In our 
case this  historical dimension is relevant for all three theories, especially IPR, because 
we are talking about long-term precondition. Other events could have happened around 
the collapse of the USSR that effeected the precondtions, which are not observable today 
, these could be the real cause of the variation, not, instead of the supposed cause: IPR. 
For instance, the elite fragmentation can have been settled by the “pacts” being done by 
the elits in 1991, and casting shadows unto the figures for 2004. The longer since the his-
torical unknown cause, the greater the chanse for this source of invalidity. 
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Selecting correct units can be a cause of invalidity, but since the research question is to 
look for the preconditions of FSU democracy, the selection of units is valid. However, the 
“outer validity” might suffer when I generalize from a test on the FSU transition to all  
transitions to democracy. (Lund, 1996:33) 
Subjective mistakes. Intrasubjectivity in my data is fairly low is , because over time I 
have run regression on both the  Freedom House scale 2003  and 2005  and Polity 4 2003  
has been used and gave fairly the same results (apart from some important difference 
later discussed, especially in Ukraine and Georgia). The differences between results over 
time could probably not be measurement mistakes, but be due to real changes in data for 
the units, because the political development in the FSU change so fast, especially since 
2003. Intersubjectivity is wether or not other scientists reach the same result from the 
same data. A
Interasubjectivity is to see if different scholars reach the same result with the same data 
(Hellvik, 1999:168) Other scholars have run similar tests: Vanhanen has run  IPR on Free-
dom scale 2003, Fish on HDI. But not with the exact same data and year as i have. 
Indexes. The  validity of IPR has been put under question for other validity problem;  
an index “overheats” when it measures too many of the same phenomena, which is likely 
that the subindexes of the IPR does. I ran a intra-index test on the IPR index to check 
for multi-collinarity.  The bivariate analysis of subindex Economic Decentralisation (ED) 
and IPR  shows  a strong correlation which  weakens the reliability of the index, but not 
severely. 
8. 8 Reliability of the empirical data 
The large majority of empirical data for the analysis derive mostly from these sources: 	

	
 Vanhanen: “Prospects of democracy. A study of 17o countries” Routledge, London, 2003.
	
 Freedom House Country Report 2005
	
 Erik Herron : “Too few or too many parties”, Conference paper (Results 1998-2002)
	
 Electionworld.org : Results for Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia 
Sources of information. These three first are  secondary sources, users, not produc-
ers,  of statistical data.  The reliability of that  data this depends on my confidence in 
these  secondary sources ability to gather correct information from their sources, and the 
primary sources ability to collect data. The greatest advantage of Freedom House and 
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UNDP is that they are comparative and made on an international level, so their analysis 
of data is done by comparative means, and intended for comparative research. Freedom 
House is a  international data user, that combines information from statistical bureaus 
and governmental institutions in East European and Central Asian with assessments 
from scholars in and outside the FSU. UNDP is an international data user, whose statistic 
data come from UN-related sources: UN Population Division, UNESCOs statistics and 
the World Bank. Freedom House have the advantage of several decades of  experience 
with cross-country comparable analyzes, and UNDP experience since 1993.  I confide in 
these providers an regard source reliability as good. 
As for the elite dimension, I use Herrons calculations and my own.  Herron has  done his 
tests on election results, and to test the reliability  I calculated some of the same numbers 
and got the same result.  Gel´man reaches the same result for Russia. Electionworld is 
not a user of data, and electoral results given here are provided by election committees in 
the respective countries. The results of presidential elections between 2002 and Dec 30 
2004 I have calculated by the formula given by Laakso/Taagpera.  
Subjective. Qualitative data on political democracy  can be subjective, and this is what 
our operationalisations are trying to avoid. Atleast the same method for creating this 
scale is applied to all 15 FSU, and this means the evt. mistakes in validation would be 
equal to all units, and not affect the reliability as much as if the same mistake was made 
for some and some others not. The most severe   reliability problem  due to subjective-
ness is related to the operationalisation of political freedom, as Freedom House use both 
quantitate sources and qualitative assessment to measure freedom. The comparative pur-
pose for which the  Freedom scale is produced, is important. Problematic can be that 
Freedom scale is a political institution apart from being academic: it advocates political 
freedom as an idea, and tries to lobby American politics with country reports: 
Freedom House (...) conducts advocacy, education, and training initiatives that promote human rights, democracy, free market economics, the rule 
of law, independent media, and US engagement in international affairs.  (Freedomhouse.org/About us) 
 This could affect the outcome in the direction  that “worst cases”, political pariahs for 
US government foreign policy, (e.g. Cuba, Syria, North Korea) gets rated worse than ob-
jectively valid, or that the US gets better(higher) than objectively valid. In the FSU set-
ting this could  theoretically lead to a overestimation of the new freedom in Georgia and 
in Ukraine (now closer US allies, rejecting treaties with Russia, Ukraine opting for 
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NATO membership)  and a devaluation of “lost friends” like Uzbekistan (rejecting 
American bases on its territory since 2005) . 
 Dysfunctional collection. Another reliability problem for data is  is the infrastruc-
ture for collection of statistical data: Not all FSUs have a functioning Statistical Service 
Bureau. In many states, especially the least developed or the most closed, the national 
statistical data is based on inexact information and international comparing bodies will 
have to make approximations and estimates.  Remote regions, poor infrastructure, lin-
guistic misunderstanding, unclear border relations, popular skepticism to provide infor-
mation for central government are amongst factors with complicate the correct data. 
The second problem is the “plan economy” tradition from when statistics were often 
manipulated to appear successful (Waage, 1991). An example is the reporting of cotton 
production in the Breshnev area, where tons of cotton existed only at the paper. Many 
NGOs in democracy and human rights fields claim that closed countries like Turkmeni-
stan and Belarus still produce such untrue information to “look good”, especially data 
concerning democracy.  Freedom House calculates with this effect, but still it is a chal-
lenge for the reliability.  
Unequal collection. The reliability for a comparative study is even further enhanced 
by the  fact that some states have better collection of data than other. Although all states 
have post-soviet features, some states are small and easy to get a overview over, while 
some are large and rural, like Russia´s regions are or Kazakhstan.  Some have internal 
conflicts, like Georgia and Tajikistan, which make data collection difficult. This makes 
the reliability of the data of each country even less, and the more misbalance from coun-
try to country, the lesser reliability on the comparative analysis. 
Missing values. My operationalisation of elite fragmentation was based on the last 
presidential elections, but this lead to the loss of Latvia and Estonia, who are parliamen-
tary, and the “time lag” for Moldova, which has not had a president election since 1996. 
Misplot. Misplotting values, or other mistakes in the but the number of N is low in my 
study , so it easy visible. I can minimize the risk by using common sense when reviewing 
figures. I can also  double check and let other scholars review the dataset,  which is done 
in the case of elite fragmentation.  
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Not great,  but as good as it gets. My conclusion on the reliability of my empirical 
data is therefore that is is partially poor and inconsistent, and not precise, both from case 
to case, and especially when comparing some cases with higher reliability than other.  
Still I conclude that it is  “as good as it can get”.  I have used statistical sources of reputa-
tion and double checked several sources on each country and run a set of reliability tests. 
To solve the problem of lack of exact data I have chosen a crude, minimalist definition of 
democracy for which there exist a academic recognized measure scale. I choose data until 
Dec 30 2004 because  it is the year where all my sources could give me  the most reliable 
and comparable data, especially the Freedom Scale. 
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9.  THE FINAL DISCUSSION 
My  research question has been if structural approaches to can uncover structural pre-
condition for political freedom in the FSU. I launched three structural theories, based on 
development theory, democracy theory and elite theory that might explain the variation 
of political freedom. I operationalised the theories and tested them one by one, and ana-
lyzed a possible joint model of two factors. Here I discuss the results, theory by theory 
and for the model. 
Discussion Socioeconomic theory 
The level of socioeconomic development does not seem to be an important precondition 
for explaining political freedom in the FSU. The correlation is low and not significant.  
The theory suggests that high levels will foster free societies. I operationalised the level 
as a combination of wealth, education and health precondition measured in HDI- but 
the test for regression showed that there was no linear relationship, and neither did cross 
tabulation show any significant bivariate relationship of size. Belarus and Azerbaijan are 
typical examples of FSUs with a high HDI - but low political freedom. 
Maybe this explainable by the fact that the real difference in HDI between the FSU is 
not large, and nothing near to explain the enormous difference in political freedom. Most 
of FSU  (apart from the Baltics) are in the UNDPS range of “medium HDI -countries”  
countries and, and although there exists internal differences in the value, this difference 
might not be significantly large enough to strengthen the HDI theory, given that the 
theory is correct. We always risk discarding a true hypothesis because of mistakes in va-
lidity, reliability or research design. In this case the largest mistake might lie in the choice 
of sample, since reliability and validity are generally considered high: the HDI is pro-
duced by a reliable source and it is created of several dimension to create an impression 
of socioeconomic development. A weakness of this index for comparing differences in 
the FSU is that high education is one of their prime soviet heritage similarities, still 15 
years after, and the level of education will create a HDI that is similar all over the FSU.  
Nevertheless, my research question was out to find precondition to explain FSU varia-
tion, and our finding indicate that HDI is not such a precondition. My  finding is  in ac-
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cordance with amongst other Fish, who also found little covariation between the level of 
HDI and Freedom scale (Fish, 1998). 
Discussion IPR theory 
IPR theory seems to explain a large part of the variation of political democracy. The 
theory assumes that a distribution of economical and intellectual power resources (like 
property and education) will create larger political freedom through political power-
sharing. The theory was tested by regression analysis. The relationship was linear and sig-
nificant, and IPR could explain ca. 60-70% of the sample. Looking at the cases, IPR 
fairly well explained the level of political freedom too, with Georgia and Armenia as  im-
portant outliers. This strengthens the IPR theory. We  discarded the zero-hypothesis. 
However,  the same potential  threats to validity and reliability as the discarded socio-
economic theory apply also to IPR. The operationalistaion could be invalid - not measur-
ing the real distribution of power resources. This for instance given that Eastern Europe 
is a historically more political and centralized region than Western Europe, - this being 
reflected in the fact that what IPR measures in FSU are not as relevant as power re-
sources as it might be in other regions, where economy is more diverse, civil society 
stronger and the state weaker and governmental power less concentrated. Property rights 
 are historically “an imported phenomena” for the average Russian, imported in the 
1800s, and never really established (Wortman, 2004/ Kotsonis 1989). IPRs validity is fur-
ther taken into doubt by the fact that IPR is an index. Indexes have the same problem as 
a model with many explanatory variables - if you have many enough you can explain eve-
rything. Reliability of the IPR is also limited by difficult collection of data (Vanhanen has 
not been able to update since 2003, and some data in the index are from 1998). therefore 
there is a mis-relationship between old IPR and present Freedom scores. 
Discussion Elite theory 
The Elite theory explains only part of the variation. In the chapter on theory I worried  
that elite fragmentation and political freedom might be the same phenomena - mixing 
cause and effect. Elite theory also suffers from definitional invalidity: it only measures 
the political strength of elite in a given election, as can be the case with Georgian Rose-
Revolution. Maybe elites “fight” on other scenes, or maybe the measured election is not 
representative for the structure of the elite.   Our regression analysis and our simple table 
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analysis lead us to strengthen/verify the hypothesis of the theory, and we discard the 
zero-hypothesis;  correlation does exists. The data for elite theory are pretty reliable: cen-
tral committees official election results. However, many elections in the FSU are deemed 
not be free or fair, for instance the latest presidential election in Belarus March 17 2006. 
The president Lukashencka got approximately 3/4 of the votes, but most western observ-
ers deemed the election to be marred by irregularities (Press, 2006). Calculating the elite 
fragmentation on base of a fake election would on one hand prove that there is no visible 
elite capable of challenging the elite in government. However, if such elite does exist, and 
is almost strong enough to force a colour revolution (and thus a free election where elites 
fragmentation can be viewed more objectively), the fraudulent election result will cover 
the existence of such elite. The definition of fragmented elite might improve the ex-
planatory power of this elite  theory. The definition could be improved and developed by 
case studies. A index might be a better way to reflect elite fragmentation, rather than 
then the competitiveness in a given  election. Elements could be diversification of econ-
omy,  ethnical division, the strength of oppositional forces or simply a formula combining 
the effective candidates in presidential and parliamentary elections, or several elections 
over time.  Assessment could also be a method, like it is with freedom score. Especially 
interesting is the fact that the elite operationalistion shows outlier  in Georgia, and in 
Armenia. Elite fragmentation is worth a closer look. Its combination with IPR seems to 
be fruitful. 
Discussion of a model 
In my  model IPR is seen as the hinter-laying factor and Elite fragmentation as the me-
diary factor. The indirect effect of IPR over elite is larger than the sum of IPRs effect 
and Elites effect alone. This indicates that elite fragmentation could be a precondition 
for political freedom in some cases. A closer look at the residuals shows that this case is 
atleast Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. If we left out the lower part of the 
scale,  Central Asian countries, and the higher end, the Baltics, we might find that frag-
mentation of elites can explain the level of political freedom in the middle region of Cau-
casus and Slavic Europe, where other factors like geopolitics (e.g. Russia vs EU both have 
interest in these countries) or IPR (Medium level) are relatively equal. Case studies would 
be a  better method  to examine this result more closely. 
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Discussion of preconditions
Pinpointing relevant preconditions for political freedom in the FSU  is complicated.  
Distribution of economical power and eduction  has proven an important precondition. 
Elite fragmentation shows potential to be an important explanatory factor, atleast in the 
“middle” segment of my sample - where the effect of IPR is less clear, because IPR is at 
medium values. 
The complexity  of Pridhams model comes back to haunt the discussion of precondi-
tions. A large range of factors should have to be considered to create the full picture . 
IPR and elite can not alone explain the level of political freedom. It is likely to be influ-
enced by other internal factors, like  the ethnic composition of the population, the size 
of the country and population,  the size of a Russian minority,  internal war or peace time. 
It is also likely to be affected by external factors like geopolitical spheres, stability and 
instability in neighbouring countries, support to elites from Moscow or Washington, 
trade agreements, military alliances and other bonds. Adrian Hide-Price stresses the role 
of key international institutions active  in the FSU the EU, the OSCE and the Council of 
Europe. EU has deﬁned their closest neighbours in the Baltic, the  Balkan and Central 
Eastern Europe as the area of security intrest and “sphere”  where democracy and rule of 
law  is actively encouraged by euro in PHARE programs and  EU military and 
police-forces and resources.   (Parrot/Dawisha, 1997:9) Some states are “inter-sphere”: 
Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus were all mentioned in the EUs draft 
on the EU Commissions New neighbourhood paper of May 12 2004 and many of them are  
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which is a “Russian Union” if you 
compare it to a “European Union”. 
In some states the development after a transit to democracy is made might not favour 
liberalisation. This could be said to be the case with Belarus: it choose through elections 
a path “back to the USSR” and “strong man - strong state”- system. Russia could develop 
along the same line. Explanations to such “backlash” could be cultural:  the “Russianness” 
- the willingness to subdue to a strong state, and in order have protection, safety and be 
part of something large (empire) and sacriﬁce for large idead (socialism)  (Waage, 1991) 
Armenias “backlash”, or low freedom score  compared to the expected value from all  of 
our three theories,  could be linked with the war in Nagorno-Karabach. Both Georgia, 
Moldova, Russia  and Armenia all have internal military struggles, which could be a major 
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inﬂuence on political freedom in general.  It could also be related to oil. All the states on 
the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan-line for oil from the Caspian Sea to Turkey,  - Azerbaijan, 
Georgia (transit) and Armenia (transit) - have lower political freedom than any of the 
precondition proposed by my model explain. Geopolitics could be an explanation. When 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are surprisingly free compared to their IPR could it be because 
of their small  size and great unimportance ?  Both are small countries, few people and no 
oil. When the Baltics perform more political freedom than their IPR suggest- might it be 
an eﬀect of the EU-membership? The discussion on possible preconditions, explanatory 
factors and events goes on forever.  From the analysis we can ascertain that empirical 
tests shows evidence for the level of IPR being a precondition for liberalization in the 
FSU, that the level of HDI is not a decisive condition, but that the fragmentation of elite 
might be an important condition, especially in combination with IPR,  and speciﬁcally  
in the belt between the “unfree Central Asia” and the “free Baltic region”, in the states 
which of Caucasus and Eastern Europe, that are in ﬂux between authoritarian and liberal 
regimes - at a crossroad. 
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10.  CONCLUSION  
PRECONDITIONS FOR FREEDOM  IN 
THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
The distance from Tallinn to Tashkent is indeed long. The longest distance in freedom is 
actually from Tallin to Ashgabat, but our analysis show that some of the suggested struc-
tural preconditions in the  units were able to explain much of this  variation. The most 
important explanatory precondition seems to  be IPR. IPR reflects the distribution of 
political and economical power resources in a country, and assumes that this creates 
higher political freedom. My analysis of the former soviet republics show that there is a 
strong relationship between having a high IPR and high political freedom. (Regression 
analysis shows a significant valid persons r of 0,76, which is  very high for social science) . 
Similar strong relationships were not shown for the elite fragmentation, where the corre-
lation was weak,  and especially not for the HDI, where the correlation was not signifi-
cant. It was impossible to combine all three factors in a model because of high interac-
tion between the independent variables. 
Validity for the finding of IPR and HDI is high. The index that constitutes IPR, HDI 
and Freedom score are well established and long elaborated operationalisations of their 
theoretical size, and both validity and reliability of data I judged being sufficient, atleast 
for making a comparisons and testing the theories. 
When validity of data are so high and no correlations are shown for HDI, on Freedom, I 
regard this mostly as a weakening of the theory´s real ability to explain the variation of 
freedom: HDI is not a significant precondition for liberalisation and for explaining po-
litical freedom in the FSU. 
The opposite conclusion is drawn for IPR theory. Due to  high validity and reliability of 
the data and a high explanatory effect (Pearsons r) IPR seems to be a significant precon-
dition for political freedom in the FSU.  
The factor of elite fragmentation remains the difficult interpretation. One reason is the 
uncertain validity of the data. The measurement of elite fragmentation has not been tried 
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on freedom scale before, as I know of. It is not a index, and its validity might fall victim 
for unrepresentative elections which  don´t reflect the real elite fragmentation. Our 
causal analysis of the model indicates that IPR in combination with elite fragmentation 
can increase the explanatory power for explaining variation of political freedom in the 
FSU. The regression of elite fragmentation on freedom individually is weak, but scruti-
nizing the regression output closely we find that elite theory in combination with IPR 
seems to predict well the freedom score of  Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. This suspi-
cion is further strengthened by the causal analysis where we observe a indirect effect of 
elite and IPR which is larger than IPRs or Elites direct effects. When this is observed for 
the whole sample, it is likely that it could be even stronger if applied only to a small 
number of states in the “twilight” between high and low IPR and geopolitical field be-
tween “east and west”.   The academic implication of this finding  is that elite theory 
should be taken into consideration to explain political freedom in these three countries, 
where colour revolutions have happened. Instinctively it would be interesting to analyze 
if the lack of fragmentation in Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Armenia can explain the 
same “democratic backlash”. 
HDI is not such a precondition. The political implication of that finding is that policy 
makers who wish to empower liberalization in the FSU and raise the level of political 
freedom can not go over the strategy of liberalization trough economical growth and rais-
ing living standards. A good indication of this is Belarus, with rising HDI and low politi-
cal freedom, or Russia after the oil price rice early in the 2000s- ever higher HDI, and 
ever lower political freedom. (Freedom House, 2005:Russi) It also means that all forms 
for trade and modernisation might not be automatically increasing liberalization. Russia, 
Belarus and Azerbaijan prove the quite opposite. 
The political implication of finding IPR to be a important precondition is that any pol-
icy or intent to increase the distribution of economical power resources and intellectual 
power resources will probably raise the level of political freedom. This could mean sup-
port to land reforms, fair privatization of state property, increased education especially in 
areas with low educational levels and market reforms that favor small and medium-sized 
companies before large companies. 
The political implication of the effect of elite fragmentation is that any support that will 
empower elites outside governmental power will eventually increase the political free-
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dom. This could mean support of oppositional parties in elections, strengthening the role 
of civil society, especially in areas where it is expected to represent alternative elites, em-
power ethnical groups who are outside political power and other policy means that might 
favor competition between elites: either strengthening the elites outside government or 
w How the three theories can explain weakening elite in government. 
Concluding my research question I can answer positively to the open question: can the 
theories  explain the variation. Yes, IPR and elite can explain variation, but HDI can not. 
 This means there exists structural preconditions in the former soviet union republics 
that explain the variation of political freedom and that  can be affected by policy, inter-
nally and externally.  How the three theories can explain variation is shown in the model 
and argued in the conclusion. 
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Center for Global Policy, George Mason University
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